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JURISDICTION
The Trial Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Order on the 15th day of September, 1993. A timely Notice
of Appeal was filed October 14, 1993. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Annotated 78-2A-3(2)(k).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM BASED UPON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The

Trial

Court

erred

in

failing

to

grant

Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Dismiss based upon the applicable
Utah and Texas Statutes of Limitations.
Standard of Review
The questions of statutory construction and application are
questions of law that require no particular deference to the Trial
Court's interpretation.

Roosevelt City v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738

(Utah App. 1991); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033
(Utah 1989) .
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
A.

The Trial Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment based upon the Trial Court's selected facts while ignoring
other facts which create a genuine issue of fact.
B.

The Trial Court erred in receiving and considering as

undisputed fact, evidence in violation of the parole evidence rule.

1

C.

The Trial Court erred in receiving and considering, as an

undisputed fact, a document, the consideration of which violated
the Statute of Frauds.
Standard of Review
1.

Summary Judgment

is appropriate only when no genuine

issue of material fact exists and it clearly appears that there is
no reasonable probability that the party moved against can prevail.
Snyder v. Merkley. 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984).
2.

In determining where the Trial Court correctly found that

there were no genuine issues of material fact, the Appellate Court
reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.

It reviews the Trial

Court's conclusions of law for correctness including its conclusion
that there are no material fact issues.

Schurtz v. BMW of North

America, Inc. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
EVIDENCED BY ITS ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, THE CONTENTS OF WHICH EVIDENCE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT.
Standard of Review
See paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Mountain States Telephone and

Telegraph Company v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d
1258 (Utah 1984) .
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT GARY
BRIGGS/ MOTION TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE THIRD PARTIES.
Standard of Review
The Trial Court reviews questions of law for correctness.
2

Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., supra.
Statutes
The text of the following Statutes is as set forth in Addendum
A attached hereto.
308;

UCA, §25-5-4; §70A-8-204; §70A-8-301; §70A-8-

§70A-8-313; §70A-8-314; §70A-8-319; §78-12-45; Texas

Civil

Proc. SIV.P; Rem Code §16-003,051; UCA, §48A-2A-1001 et seq. UCA.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature

of

the

Case.

The

unverified

Complaint

of

Plaintiff seeks recovery of 32,190 shares of stock of Digitran,
Inc.

(See Addendum B)
The Plaintiff claims that Briggs converted the stock to

his own use and seeks the return of the shares of stock and/or the
value of the shares of stock and any benefits or value accruing to
the shares of stock.
B.

Course of the Proceedings. Briggs filed an answer and an

amended answer to Plaintiff's Complaint.
Deposition.

Plaintiff took Briggs'

The deposition, together with 34 exhibits and an

affidavit of Plaintiff were submitted to the Court for decision
upon the Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
C.

Disposition in the Trial Court.

The District Court of

Cache County, the Honorable Gordon J. Low presiding, granted
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and denied the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment to dismiss the complaint.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1981 Gary M. Briggs, a resident of the State of California in
1981 purchased a unit of a Louisiana limited partnership known as
"Crane Development, Ltd. Partnership"**

(Depo. TR 6, 1. 12) (Ex.

1)
The

consideration

for

the

Limited

Partnership

$128,632 of which $57,750 was cash. (Depo. 10, 1. 25)

Unit

was

In addition

to the cash contribution to Crane Development, Briggs was required
to execute a promissory note in the amount of $70,882.00 to the
partnership, due and payable on November 30, 1990.
11)

(Depo. TR p.

The purchase of the limited partnership unit occurred in

Louisiana.

(Depo. 14)

Crane Development had a research on the

development agreement with Digitran,m Inc.
1986 On April 1, 1986, Digitran, Inc. offered to discount the
note payable to Crane Development Ltd. Partnership in exchange for
the sum of $30,400 for each unit as full payment of the 1990 note
and stock in Digitran, Inc. The offer was made by Loretta Records,
President, Digitran, Inc.

(Ex. 1(a), Depo. p. 21 - 24) Defendant,

on April 30, 1986, exercised the option to prepay the 1990 note and
tendered the sum of $30,400 to Digitran, Inc.

(Ex. 2, Depo. p. 25

1. 24; p. 26)

* Depo. refers to the deposition of Gary Briggs. Plaintiffs affidavit refers to Plaintiffs Affidavit on
file. Ex. refers to Deposition Exhibits. Rec. refers to record.
The purpose of Crane Development Ltd was to conduct R&D for the creation of simulator
technology for large crane operations. The Defendant, Briggs claims the Plaintiff has converted the technology
for her entity Digitran, Inc. without paying any royalty for the use of the technology.
4

As cited above as additional consideration of the prepayment
of the note by Briggs, Digitran, Inc. agreed to issue to the
limited partners a number of shares in Digitran, Inc. at a market
price of 75C per share.

(Depo. Ex. 2)

The stock to be issued to

Gary Briggs should have been 40,533 shares.

The stock was not

delivered by Digitran, Inc. to Briggs as agreed.

(Ex. 3, 4; Depo.

p. 42, 1. 14 - 20; Depo. 43, 1. 13 - 17)
1987 - 1988 Gary Briggs then a resident of Colorado, between
May of 1987 through February of 1988, went to the office of
Digitran, Inc. in Louisiana.
Merrill-Lynch.

Gary Briggs was an employee of

Plaintiff, Loretta Penfold Records fixes the date

as October 8, 1987.

(PI. Aff., Rec. 124)

Gary Briggs describes the conversation prior to the delivery
of the stock and irrevocable stock power as expressing concerns
that Digitran was having numerous problems meeting its obligations
relative to Crane Partnership.
with

the

payment

partnership.

(TR 43)

Digitran as agreed.
Note:

of

(Depo. TR 42) There were problems

royalties

by

Digitran/Digicrane

to the

Briggs had not received his stock from

(Depo. 42)***

Defendant's counsel's objection as written in the

record based upon the Parole Evidence Rule.

(TR 44, 1. 1)

By reason of the defaults of Digitran, Inc., Loretta Records
delivered to Gary Briggs 32,190 shares of her personal stock and

Briggs purchased a unit of Crane Development. Crane Development had an agreement with
Digitran, Inc. or Digicrane to provide research and development funds to Digitran-Digicrane in exchange for
royalties to be paid to the partnership.

5

irrevocable stock power (Addendum B).

Gary Briggs describes his

understanding of the transactions as his option to use the stock as
he felt necessary to fulfill the unpaid debts relative to Digicrane
Digitran.

(TR 44, 1. 21 - 25)

The conversations between the

parties over Brigg's counsel's objection was as follows:
TR 42:
Q: So somewhere in 1987 or early 1988 when you received the stock
certificate identified as Exhibit 6, can you tell me under what
circumstances it was received?
A: There had been numerous problems relative to performance on the
part of Digitran - Digicrane and obligations relative to the Crane
partnership and the repayment offer that I had subscribed to and
this document. The original of the document represented by Exhibit
6 was given to me by Loretta Records as security that the good
faith performance would be followed by Digitran/Digicrane.
TR 43:
A: There were problems relative to royalties. There would have
been numerous lack of good faith efforts on the part of Digitran Digicrane and when this stock was given to me it was not
specifically related to the issuance of 40,000 shares connected
with the prepayment.
TR 44:
Q: The discussions you have had with Loretta Records which led to
the delivery of this stock certificate on Exhibit 6 was there a
clear understanding in your mind as to what a good faith
performance would be?
I am referring back to your earlier
statement that this was to be security that good faith performance
would be followed through.
A:

No.

Q:

So it was unclear as to what was good faith performance?

A:

That is correct.

Q: Let me ask you, what do you mean by security, when you use the
word security? Does that imply that this stock was for you to take
and use for your own from that point forward?
A:
I would have the option to use it as my own if I felt it
necessary to fulfill unpaid debts relative to Digitran/Digicrane.
6

Q:

Was it your option?

A: Yes.
Q:

What would trigger the option?

A:

There was no specific trigger that was identified.

TR 45:
Q: Under what sorts of circumstance would you have returned the
stock?
A:

We had no specific agreement.

Q: Let me ask you again. How do you define the term "security" as
you used it earlier?
A:
That would have been the option to sell or exchange of
certificate to obtain funds in payment for unpaid debt.
TR 45:
Q: Do you believe that when you got the stock certificate that the
next day or immediately for that matter that the stock certificate
could be transferred into your name without further recourse such
that it became your stock?
A: Yes.
TR 46:
Q: When do you believe, under what set of circumstances, would
whatever obligation you felt was owed to you arising out of your
Crane Partnership be satisfied? What amount of compensation, what
amount of performance would you be satisfied with in connection
with this transaction? It is unlimited?
A: At this point in time I would say that it is primarily tied to
the payment of royalty monies owed to me as a result of Simulator
Development and the manufacture and sale and ongoing commencement
for an ongoing proper accounting of funds due and the commitment to
make future payments.
TR 49:
Q: Let me come back to the track I was following a little bit
earlier. If I were to try to assess what you believe is owed to
you, arising out of the whole transaction, how would you tell me I
should quantify what you are owed?

7

A: At this point in time the balance owed to me is represented by
the royalties on simulator sale, crane simulator sales and those
royalties outlined in the Manufacturing and Marketing Agreement
which has been entered into.
TR 49:
Q: Do you consider the stock that was represented by Exhibit 6 as
part of that compensation or is it related more to a concept of the
royalty that you are concerned about?
A:

The value of the stock would relate to the royalty issue.

TR 57:
Q: Did you have any discussion with Loretta Records at the time
you obtained the certificate identified in Exhibit 6 as to what
this irrevocable stock or bond power on that exhibit was and how it
worked?
A:

Yes.

Q: Can you tell me as best you can recall, what the discussion was
that took place at that time?
A: The reason for the stock power was that her merely giving
the Digitran certificate was of no value relative to any kind
security or collateral in that I had no way of recourse relative
selling or disposing of that stock. It was therefore necessary
have a stock power in conjunction with the stock for it to be
any value to me personally.

me
of
to
to
of

TR 58:
Q:

Was that explained to Loretta Records at the time?

A:

Yes.

Q: Did you tell her that the execution by her of such a stock
power would in fact allow you to transfer that stock in your name?
A: Yes.
As a result of this conversation relayed by Gary Briggs,
Plaintiff/Gallent executed Exhibit 6 which is an irrevocable stock
or bond power. A copy of Exhibit 6 is attached hereto as Addendum
B.

The stock power and stock certificate were delivered on that

date to the Defendant.
8

On March 17, 1988, Gary Briggs, now a resident of Texas,
demands payment of interest on the money he advanced to prepay the
note by reason of the failure of Digitran, Inc. to issue the stock
agreed upon.
Loretta

(Ex. 7; Depo. p. 51 - 52)

Records

performance.

Gallent,

(Ex. 7)

president

Briggs wrote letters to
of

Digitran,

demanding

Exhibit 8 is a check by Loretta Records as

an officer of Simulator Research. She represented herself to be an
officer

of

Partnership.

the

general

partner

of

Crane

Development

Ltd.

She paid interest to Briggs on money advanced years

earlier to prepay the 1990 note. Therefore the Plaintiff, Loretta
Records in addition to being an individual plaintiff in this case,
is also the president of Digitran, Inc. or Digicrane and is the
sole owner of the stock in Simulator Research, Inc., the general
partner of the limited partnership, a unit of which is owned by
Gary Briggs.

(Ex. 19 p. 10)

The defaults of Digitran continued.

In 1988 Gary Briggs had

not received the shares of stock to be issued in consideration of
his prepayment of the note nor had he received royalties from the
general partner Simulator Research which is wholly owned by Loretta
Gallent.

(See Ex. 7)

Exhibit 7 does not contain any offer by

Briggs to return any personal stock of Loretta Gallent's upon
delivery by Digitran of the stock to him.

In 1988 Digitran

continued to send Gary Briggs documents for his execution at his
Texas address.

(See Ex. 9 and 10)

On November 22, 1988, Digitran, Inc. issued to the Defendant
40,533 shares of stock.

(PI. Aff. p. 3, Rec. p. 203)
9

1989

On September 25, 1989, and thereafter the Defendant made

requests upon Loretta Gallent at Logan, Utah for the payment of
royalties.

(Ex. 28)

Briggs was then a resident of the State of

Texas; Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Utah.

The demands

for royalties continued until the time of the commencement of the
suit.

(See Ex. 13, 15, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31)
The Plaintiff and her companies moved to Utah approximately

November of 1988.

(See Plaintiff's Affidavit

attached

to the

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Rec. p. 2 03)
Briggs refused to return the 32,160 shares of stock upon the
delivery to him of the 40,533 shares of stock, upon the basis that
Digitran, Loretta Gallent and Simulator Research, all of which were
either owned or controlled by Loretta Gallent, had failed to pay
royalties as provided in the agreements between the parties.
Ex. 1, 17 p. 6, Ex. 19 p. 70, Ex. 20 p. 6)

(See

Many letters passed back

and forth, however, none resulted in the payment of a royalty nor
the resolution of the case.
1992

Briggs was served with Summons in this action on January

5, 1992 while in Utah attempting to attend the stockholders meeting
of Digitran in Logan, Utah.
The Deposition of Gary Briggs was taken December 18, 1992. By
agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant, it was published for
the court's consideration.
At

the time of the Briggs deposition,

Plaintiff

produced

Exhibit 33 (see Appendix C) which appears to claim that the receipt
of this stock is in exchange for the right to receive royalties.
10

The document could not be identified by Gary Briggs nor has the
document been identified by any other person.
The deposition also contains Exhibit 34 which is a document
produced by Loretta R. Gallent which claims to be a copy of an
original document delivered to Gary Briggs.

Neither Exhibits 33

nor 34 were signed by Briggs nor delivered to him and Briggs claims
then, as now, that neither can be enforced against him by reason of
the Statute of Frauds.
Plaintiff's Complaint

in this action is a complaint for

conversion or the return of personal property or its value.

Gary

Briggs moved the Court for the joinder of third parties and/or
interpleader on the 22nd day of January, 1993.

The motion was

answered by the Plaintiff, and the Trial Court, in error, denied
the motion.

Loretta Penfold Records, a/k/a Loretta Gallent,

individually, is the Plaintiff in this action.

She is also the

sole stockholder of Simulator Research, Inc., which is the general
partner of Crane Development Ltd. Partnership.
owner of one unit of Crane Development.

Gary Briggs is an

Loretta is also the

President and a substantial shareholder of Digitran, Inc. and
Digicrane.

An

agreement

between

Digitran,

Inc.

and

Crane

Development, the limited partnership, contains an agreement for the
payment of royalties.

(See Ex. 17 and 19)

sales and has failed to pay royalties.

Digitran generated

Gary Briggs claims he is

entitled to royalties under his agreement, and, therefore, Loretta
Gallent, as the president and general partner of Crane Development
and Digitran Inc. are necessary parties to this action if a
11

determination of royalties or any offsetting obligations is to be
made.
Each party moved the Trial Court for summary disposition;
Briggs claiming the Plaintiff's action was barred by the Statute of
Limitations and Gallent claiming her right to the return of the
stock.

The Trial Court denied the Defendant's Motion for Summary

disposition
disposition.

and

granted

the

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Thereafter Defendant made a request for additional

rulings citing the portions of the record ignored by the Court in
making its determination.
Memorandum Decision.

The Court thereafter entered a second

Plaintiff submitted to the Court and the

Court signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order
granting the Summary Judgment and dismissing the Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

(Rec. p. 255) (Addendum D)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
POINT I
The Trial Court erred in failing to grant Defendant's motion
for Summary Judgment based upon Utah's borrowing statute cited as
78-12-45 U.C.A. which provides that a cause of action arising in
another state, if barred in that state, is barred in the State of
Utah. Briggs received from Loretta Gallent 32,160 shares of stock
and an irrevocable stock power on October 8, 1987 in Louisiana.
Digitran issued the 40,533 shares of stock on November 22, 1988 to
Gary Briggs in Texas.

The action for the return of stock was

brought by the Plaintiff on January 3, 1992 in Utah.

The Texas

Statute of Limitations of Action is two (2) years for the recovery
12
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immediately followed by entering Findings of Fact.

Finding No

sets forth three items as consideration Briggs received for the
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cancellation of a note.

The Court omits the fourth item of

consideration which was the payment of royalties. Briggs, however,
asserts that the irrevocable stock or bond power executed by
Loretta Penfold Records constitutes an unambiguous document the
execution of which irrevocably transfers all right, title and
interest in and to 32,190 shares of stock of Digitran Systems, Inc.
to the Defendant.

It is error upon the Trial Court's part to

consider, as undisputed facts, portions of the deposition of Briggs
and the affidavit of Loretta Penfold Records which modify or expand
upon the written documents she executed.
C.

The Trial Court erred in receiving and considering as an

undisputed fact a document, Exhibit 34, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum C in violation of the statute of frauds.
Exhibit 34 purports to be a document executed only by Loretta
Penfold Records on October 8, 1987, confirming an agreement to
return 32,190 shares of stock to her upon Gary Briggs receiving
40,533

shares of stock from Digitran, Inc. and omitting any

reference to royalties.
The Trial Court found in its Findings of Fact that the
Defendant had not returned 32,190 shares of stock and concluded
that the transaction between Plaintiff and Defendant is reflected
in a series of documents and there is sufficient question as to why
the 32,190 shares of stock was transferred to support the admission
of other evidence and the Trial Court concluded as follows:
"The transaction between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant is reflected in a series of
documents and there is sufficient question as
to why 32,190 shares of stock were transferred
14

to suppor t the admission of other evidence
explaining the context and understanding of
the parties at the time of the transfer.
Consequently, the court finds as a matter of
law that Exhibit 6, an irrevocable stock
power, must be construed together with other
documents which are in evidence and with the
Defendant's own testimony and the Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis :>f
the statute of frauds must be denied.
Exhibi t: 3 11 is neither signec

~r endant nor is

legitimate existence admitted b\ the Defendant,

Trial

Court

iailec

the admission

of

find

testimony

that

•:.}') e

or other

«

There is no nexus,

^revocable

documents

to

stock, power

correct

the

ambiguity.
I
Cou_"t erred

The Trial
Summary

Judgment, r "oceedino
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COL:1*-
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* .
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:ts wl i:i c l 1 c J : e r el i ed i lpoi i bj! tl le •

•

£ Lance, the Trial Cour% concedes in paragraph

i_

h^ u ; n.dir.cin *-* r f-y^-pr^ -\j~n ciu^r*-i ^'•T * * b p r o roh r sd as to why

ucrei ^
Court
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:--.. ,in
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: Fa M

royalties beina pai-1 as one ^4
Briggs.

Roys^L-Les

Briggs,

causir.a vr;-

. ;.
tonally

:..-i
ignores

stock.
the

issue of

* ^- conditions testified •-<

.. s one

Tl: le

,

-^-

ssues, as tes..nie~ ..: .,^.^

issuance

r;^ pergonal

stock

of

Loretta

• •:ag: *,

..ijdi

Lht: x b s u -

•„,•;

loyalties

weic
1 5

CLaiiuc.

,.-:

aoocited

by

Gary

Briggs.

The Trial Court, however, dismissed the issue with the

conclusion that there was no other obligation at that time owed to
Gary Briggs and that the claim of royalties is not before the
Court.

The Court concluded that the Defendant has failed to

establish that he is entitled to retain the 32,190 shares.

The

fact that the Court and counsel thought it necessary to make
findings is irrefutable evidence of disputed issues of fact which
are before the Court, which the Court, in error, has summarily
dispensed with.
POINT IV
Loretta Gallent is the sole shareholder of Simulator Research,
Inc., the general partner of Crane Development.

She is also the

president of Digitran, Inc. and its allied corporations.

She is

individually the Plaintiff in this case and is a resident of the
State of Utah.

The issue of royalties can be determined in Utah,

where the parties reside and there the income and profits from the
business are determined.

Louisiana has no contacts with the

operation of the business at this time. Royalties are an issue and
therefore in order to have a complete adjudication of the case the
Trial Court should have included the additional parties and should
determine if royalties are owed and to whom.
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ARGUMENT

D I D T H E T R I A L C O U R T E R R IN F A I L I N G T O G R A N T D E F E N D A N T
GARY BRIGGS' MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON T H E APPLICABLE
S T A T U T E O F L I M I T A T I O N S OF T H E S T A T E S O F U T A H A N D TEXAS?
r

^ • *,'-:.:iew : • facts br iefl} as far as elates a n d r e s i d e n c e an: e

concerned :he f o l l o w i n g facts a r e p e r t i n e n t :
1.

,

--:-:r:'-

JL Cdiifori lia,

buys

a

Louisiana . imited p^Lcnershi^ U*.^L -.. ^^.;siana.
2.

,u

l:\c

Digitran

* ."icjne sjinuiatwi.
3.

Digitra:

Development.
4.

i^aor l a t e s

agrees •
direct;

i-jitrdu ..< ouisiaiid

Or An- ?

Loretta

D i g i t r a n , luc
.

.

and i ~ s p r e d e c e s s o r s m a k e a n a g r e e m e n t

Records

, -.•
w • n

~i:iggs

: - 8 - B r i g g s p a y s $30,J

is

:ii i i L o u i s i a n a ;

Gary

.-JVCI.'. ice-

the

Limited

u ,.oiorado.
• - prepay n o t e .

Briggs

is

in D e n v e r ,

Colorado.
5.

irrevocable
Briggs

. .. -. -1

i

stock

32,190

I J o i e 11 a
-rid b o n d

power

shares of stock

Pen f o3 d

Re c oi d s

(Ex. 6) a n d d e l i v e r s
Briggs a resident

ex e ci It e s

to Gary

of C o l o r a d o .

R e c o r d s a resident r. . . •::. uiia.
6.
h:i i i

Spring of 198 8 B r i g g s m o v e s to T e x a s , t a k e s stock w i t h
;i 19 8 8 L o r e t t a P e n f o l d R e c o r d s a n d D i g i t r a n ,

Ii IC . .i^/t: L O Luc- State of U t a h .
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7.

November 22, 1988 Digitran, Inc. issues from Utah 40,533

shares of stock to Gary Briggs in Texas.
8.

January 3, 1992, Loretta Penfold Records Gallent brings

an action in the State of Utah for the return of stock.
Gary Briggs is not a resident nor has he ever been a resident
of the State of Utah.
Utah's only connection with this action happens to be the fact
that Loretta Penfold Records Gallent moved to the State of Utah
along with her company Digitran Inc.
for

recovery

of

personal

property

Utah Statutes of Limitations
are

inapplicable

(78-12-

26(2) )****.
The applicable Statute of Limitation is UCA 78-12-45 which
states as follows:
When a cause of action has arisen in another
state or territory, or in a foreign country,
and by the laws thereof an action thereon
cannot there be maintained against a person by
reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon
shall not be maintained against him in this
state, except in favor of one who has been a
citizen of this state and who has held the
cause of action from the time it accrued.
This statute is commonly known as the "borrowing statute".
The issue then arises as to whether or not the statutes of
California, Texas, Louisiana or Colorado should be applied in this
action.

**** However, if they were, the action is time barred in Utah.
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The parties' so] e contact with the State of California was

c L i/ i as a :i : esi dei ice of Ga:i : 5 Br i ggs wl len 1 le pi :II r e l lased

.. .

::he unit oi trie lirrii ted partnership.

1

--1 :j:.L.a

-; . ^ j .

Gallent delivered 31. ,160 sliares tc him :^ * ne Stat,^ of Louisiana.
The contacts with the State of Louisiana by the- Dart-;P: : r: il)
that the limited partnership interest was purchased .xa LJJ . siana
and (2) that the stock certificate was delivered, to Gary Briggs •
the State of LOT iis iana .
The contacts by the parties with the State of Texas are as
follows:

32. 1°-, shares where deposit, c-a aiu ndve smef- a i a i :.: me been held
that

state
.

periods _.; - in
StOCk

.

.

. nei^ the parties have corresponded relating zo the

p p r f i f i r^»-^c

- "'i

v

"f 1V'-I ,' *" "1 ^'" "

•_

cert i n c a t e s
,T

have p r : y s i c a i i y Deeri

^x~<°

'-

_ a1 1

_

;k

situated,

A

~ • h - o n ! ' -V' -if e :i n wh:i ch t h e D e f e n d a n t
• 'ai en i i » JI

i!::l I E:i! p i ii pose

:: f

and t h e

:::orai nei icing an

action for the ret-.; n of the stock.
The majori" " v uie ±n the united states is that in choico i if
law cases, except *n contract cases where the parties have agreed
to a valid choice of law clause, the law of the state with the most
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significant relationship to the particular substantial issue is
applied

to resolve

that

issue.

Texas has adopted

this rule.

Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 665 SW2d 414 (Texas 1984).
Louisiana has adopted this rule in the case of Lee v. Ford
Motor Company, 457 S2d 193 (LA App. 2 Cir. 1984) .
The Restatement of Laws, Conflict of Laws, Section 145 dealing
with

the

conflicts

of

law

in

tort

cases

cites

the

following

criteria:
(a)

Place where the injury occurred;

(b)

Place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;

(c)

The

domicile

residence,

nationality,

place

of

incorporation, place of business of the parties; and
(d)

The place where the relationship, if any between the

parties, is centered.
Section 188 of the restatement of conflicts, contracts, states
as follows:
(a)

The place of contracting;

(b)

The place of negotiation of the contract;

(c)

The place of performance;

(d)

Location of the subject matter of the contract; and

(e)

The

domicile,

residence,

nationality,

place

of

incorporation, place of business of the parties.
In

Plaintiff's

Complaint,

Plaintiff

asks

conversion and return of personal property.
facts which sound in contract.
Plaintiff's

Complaint

for

relief

for

It also sets forth

Nonetheless, the substance of the

is a request
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for the return of personal

property,,

^o-w*-

s^ock

certificates

:

i: est:at:ernei

-^ah h a s adopted

q~. aneiM^

ndi tin,

the

81 3 I 2<

(Utah 1 9 9 1 ) .
Wheth o v * """h i s
act urn 1.1

~ ° s^v!^d as a o^v* rqp*- "''•"•ti on or a tort*.

'"'^K^

. . . . . '.r_ . _

personal property

. _.

e return ui

i (2> the reasonable va ue thereof

Whether or

not this matter is d~~ignated as a contract a c t :
the

criteria

is

the

most

significant

tort action

relationship

test.

donrractually speak: ng, Texas is the stale of performance, j.jcation
i
• . 1 i. *.-;

. -:,"

.:

-L .T

.i.e

r • ia^r'
p i a ^ r

Wiiere

t h e

COiiduCl

-

^ i^a - Lg

LI: : U r y

CaUSliig

the injur 1

ocrurrec

•jentered

rlaintif; submitted aji aifidavi: oy nej nusband stating

the domicile residence of t h ^ Defendant and

Louisiana had n "• ccntarr^ with •' h^ p a ^ i^c-

*;i

A for t e x t ) .
T1

V.. - T p - ^ Q p

n o r - | ,* H

^ •£• ! i ni : f ^ t"i ^y] ^

_ *_ .IL^J

H f~>^ p

. . .. .

^ ">**

..

o ^i 1 ^ ^

.

p. "* +" n p >-

.:

ptrso:.^.

property, or taking or detaining the persona, property of another,
a] ] of rshi~r

f--- • •-• th i n the tort action of conversion

zoi itr ac . ..-_... _
If,

stock

tail ler.

as M a m t i f f claims, delivery

stock by "• -"'
^rnt-j

or the

of the 40, 355

shares of

m e . to Gai~-r Briggs, triggered the reti irn of the
cause ^ f action against: Gary Briggs ii I Texas

expired on N o v e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 9 0 , two years p r i o r to the commencement
21

of this action.

If the cause of action accrued at the time Loretta

Penfold Records irrevocably executed the stock and bond power, the
Statute of Limitations ran on October 9, 1989, three years prior to
commencement of this action.
According to Plaintiff's affidavit

(Rec. 203), paragraph 8,

Plaintiff Loretta Penfold Records could have and should have and in
fact asked her secretary to retrieve her stock from Gary Briggs on
November 22, 1988.

She then claims that her secretary did not

retrieve her shares and failed to inform her of the fact as the
company was moving to Utah.

At this time the sole contact of all

of the parties was with the Defendant in Texas.

The Texas Statute

of Limitations is the only applicable statute of limitations taking
into consideration the criteria outlined by the courts and the
restatement

of

law.

Defendant

Gary

Briggs

is

entitled

to a

reversal of the Trial Court dismissing the Plaintiff's claims as a
matter of law.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

The

Trial

Court

granted

summary

judgment

under

circumstances where there are substantial contested issues of fact
which are acknowledged by the District Court as follows:
Is the payment of royalties by Digitran, Inc. to Gary
Briggs,

a condition barring

certificate?

the return of

Briggs Deposition says yes.

the

stock

(TR 42, 44,

45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 57, 58, 59; Ex 19, p. 70; Ex. 20, p.
6; Ex. 13, 14 15, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31)
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In contrast see

Loretta Gallent's affidavit (Rec. 203) (Ex. 33 and 34).
The Trial Court in a Memorandum Decision stated as
follows:
It is apparent that Defendant feels he has a
right to receive royalty payments from
Digicrane or Digitran. Whether he is correct
in this claim is not an issue before the
Court.
Defendant has received the stock
promised him in the prepayment agreement.
Defendant has failed to establish why he is
entitled to retain the other 32,190 shares.
Few things in this world are clear.

However, it is obvious that

the Trial Court decided a material contested issue of fact in
Plaintiff's favor and against Defendant in making the Summary
Judgment.
B.

The Trial Court erred in receiving evidence in violation

of the parole evidence rule.
Exhibit 6 is an unambiguous document in which Loretta Gallent
unequivocally conveys all of her right, title and interest in
32,190 shares of stock to Briggs.

This document was executed by

Loretta Penfold Records, aka Loretta Gallent, Plaintiff, without
any reservation or condition.

Loretta Gallent now attempts to

controvert this document and create conditions upon which the
document was given.
(Rec. 203)

See Affidavit of Loretta Penfold Records.

The question therefore is whether or not the Plaintiff

can introduce written and oral evidence to modify, interpret or
vary

the

terms

and

conditions

of

the

otherwise

unambiguous

irrevocable stock power.
In Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773
P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989) this Court said:
23

The vesper group's contention about what it
really intended and its attempt to rely on
extrinsic
evidence
in
support
of
its
contention, ignores the settled rule that in
interpreting a contract, we first look to the
four corners of the agreement to determine the
intentions of the parties.
(Citations
omitted) . The use of extrinsic evidence is
permitted only if the document appears to
incompletely express the parties' agreement or
if it is ambiguous in expressing agreement.
Exhibit 6 - the irrevocable stock or bond power is neither
ambiguous nor does it incompletely express the agreement between
the parties.
mistake.

Gallent must show clear and convincing evidence of

West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 221 Ut Adv. Rep. 12.

In his deposition, Briggs states that it was his understanding
that he could use the stock as necessary to fulfill the unpaid
debts relative to Digitran (TR 44) and that there was no specific
trigger nor specific agreement to return the stock.

(TR 45)

The

affidavit of Loretta R. Gallent says differently, obviously in an
attempt to boot strap her argument, that the irrevocable stock or
bond power incompletely expresses the parties' agreement.

The

affidavit of Loretta R. Gallent is inadmissible to create an oral
condition to the written irrevocable stock and bond power and as
such, violates the parole evidence rule.

Norton v. Blackham, 669

P.2d 857 (Utah 1983).
C.

Exhibit 34 of the Gary Briggs Deposition is not a binding

agreement between the parties and is an attempt on the part of
Loretta R. Gallent to again vary the terms of the written contract.
Exhibit 34 states as follows:
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October 8, 1987
Dear Mr. Gary Briggs:
This letter is to confirm our conversation
pertaining to my stock 32,190 shares in
certificate no. 2939. We are presently in an
underwriting and as soon as we are finished
with this project we will complete form D to
issue you 40,533 shares of restricted stock.
At that time you will return my personal stock
to me.
Sincerely yours,
Loretta P. Records
This document is not signed by Gary Briggs and its very
authenticity was questioned during the deposition at pages 3 9 - 4 3 .
The Plaintiff did not have the original of the document.

She had

no document showing proof that it was sent or delivered, nor any
evidence that it was authored or written on the date that it
purports to be.

Exhibit 34 cannot be integrated into Exhibit 6

because it does not meet the requirements of a written agreement.
Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Michael R. Francis, 646 P.2d 741
(Utah 1982) where this court said:
It is well settled that an original agreement
is within the statute of frauds.
Any
subsequent agreement which alters or amends it
must also satisfy the requirement of the
statute. Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538
P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975); Combined Metals, Inc.
v. Bastian, 71 Ut 535 267 P.2d 1020 (1928) .
This Court addressed the exact issue in Sparrow v. Tayco
Construction Co. , 846 P. 2d 1323 (Ut App. 1993) where this court
refused to integrate three of five documents because they lacked
mutual assent. Therefore, Exhibit 6, the Irrevocable Stock or Bond
25

Power, satisfies the requirement of the Statute of Frauds in that
Briggs is attempting to enforce the document against Gallent, but
Exhibit 34 does not satisfy the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds in that Exhibit 34 is not signed by Briggs.

There is no

nexus between the two documents nor is there any act which appears
in the record that is done in reliance or part performance of
Exhibit 34.

In Machan v. Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western

Real Estate & Development Company, 779 P. 2d 230

(Utah Ct. App.

1989) :
One or more writings, not all of which are to
be signed by the party to be charged may be
considered together as a memorandum for
purposes of the statute of frauds if there is
a
nexus
between
them....
the
nexus
requirement is satisfied either by express
reference in the signed writing or to the
unsigned one, or by implied reference gleaned
from the contents of the writings and the
circumstances surrounding the transaction.
Exhibit 34, therefore, cannot be integrated because it is an
offer or proposal.

It does not meet the requirements of a written

agreement as it is unsigned by the person to be charged with the
agreement and it lacks mutual assent.

(See 25-5-4 UCA 1953; §70A-

2-301(1); §70A-8-319; §70A-8-308; §70A-8-313 contained in Addendum
A)
The

deposition

of

Gary

Briggs

and

for

that

matter

the

affidavit of Loretta R. Gallent reveals the difference between
admissible
testified

evidence
relative

and
to

discoverable
the

transfer

evidence.
of

the

Gary
stock

conversations prior to the transfer of the stock.
discoverable

evidence

but

it

is
26

not

necessarily

Briggs

and

the

That may be
admissible

evidence.

The Trial Court's granting of a Motion for Summary

Judgment must be based upon competent admissible evidence not in
violation of the parole evidence rule, the statute of fraud and for
that matter not creating contested issues of fact.

Norton v.

Blackham, supra and Rainford v. Rytting. 22 Ut.2d 252 451 P.2d 769
(1969) where this Court struck an affidavit consisting entirely of
inadmissible parole evidence submitted for the purpose of varying
and adding to the terms of a written agreement of the parties.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
EVIDENCED BY THE TRIAL COURTS ENTRIES OF FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, THE CONTENTS OF WHICH
EVIDENCE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT ASSUMING THAT PLAINTIFF
HAS PROVED HER RIGHT TO INTRODUCE PAROL EVIDENCE,
The single and most pervasive fact issue created by the
Judge's

Memorandum

Decision

and

the

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law is whether or not the delivery of 32,190 shares
of stock in Digitran, Inc. by Loretta R. Gallent to Gary Briggs was
for or in consideration of the payment of royalties. The fact that
the Court and counsel for Gallent saw fit to enter Findings of Fact
rather than a recitation of undisputed facts gives rise to the
recognition that there is an undecided material fact before this
Court. The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision recognizes this fact
at pages 3 and 4.

(See Rec. 243, Addendum 1)

Findings of Fact

signed by the Court recognize the issue at paragraph 6 of the Facts
and paragraph 4 of the Conclusion of Law.

(Addendum E) See Shayne

v. Stanley & Sons, Inc., 605 P.2d 775 (Utah 1980) which requires
counsel for both parties to stipulate to the facts.
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Webster v.

Sill, 675 P. 2d 1170 (Utah 1983) which states that upon a Motion for
Summary Judgment it is not for the Court to weigh evidence or
assess credibility.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO JOIN NECESSARY THIRD PARTIES.
Loretta Gallent is the sole shareholder of Simulator Research,
a Louisiana corporation which is the general partner of Crane
Development, a Louisiana Limited Partnership.

Loretta Gallent is

also the president of Digitran, Inc., which has an operating
agreement with Crane Development to pay royalties.
19)

(See Ex. 17 and

Inasmuch as the sole owner of Simulator, which is the only

general

partner,

and

the

president

of

the

royalty

paying

corporation are one and the same person, there is a substantial
conflict of interest.

Defendant has the right under §48A-2A-1001

ect. to maintain this action.

Digitran, Inc. and its subsidiary

Simulator Research, Inc., the general partner of Crane Development,
are necessary parties.

To leave them out of the loop would allow

the Plaintiff, as an individual, to assert a plethora of defenses
against the general partner of the limited partnership and Digitran
without their presence in court.
The deposition of Gary Briggs corroborates the fact that the
transfer of stock by Loretta Records, an individual, to Gary Briggs
was in part consideration for the corporation's failure to meet its
obligation to the limited partnership for the payment of royalties.
Also for the failure of the general partner to in turn secure
royalties from the corporation.
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The

inclusion

procedure.

of

the necessary parties

Procedural law dictates the rights of the parties to

appear before the Court.
case.

is a matter of

Utah Procedure is applicable in this

Buhler v. Maddison, 166 P.2d 205 (Utah 1946) .
In Plaintiff's answer to Briggs' Motion to join third parties

the Plaintiff attached to the answer an affidavit together with
exhibits from the Plaintiff.

(See Rec. 118)

The attachments show

a clear intention on the part of the Plaintiff acting as the sole
owner of Simulator Research, the general partner, to release
obligations of a debt and her conduct as the president of Simulator
Research is in direct derogations of the rights of the limited
partners which further illustrate the err of the Trial Court in
failing to join the indispensable parties to this action.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law Gary R. Briggs, Defendant/Appellant is
entitled to a summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint by
reason of the failure of Plaintiff to institute this action within
the

appropriate

limitations

of

action.

Alternatively,

the

Defendant Gary M. Briggs is entitled to a Motion for Summary
Judgment based upon the Plaintiff's execution of an irrevocable
stock or bond power the terms of which cannot be varied by parole
evidence and have not been varied by reason of other documents
unsigned by Gary M. Briggs. The Order of the Trial Court should be
reversed and Plaintiff's Complaint dismissed.
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DATED this g^i day of December, 1^93
PRESTOS & CHAMBERS
George W. Preston

A t t o r n ^ ^ E o r DefendantMppelkfcfit ~
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25-5-4

FRAUD

pi icable where the alleged acts of part performance were not referable to the alleged oral
contract to sell land. McDonald v. Barton Bros.
Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981).
The doctrine of partial performance was not
applicable where all of the acts alleged were
not exclusively referable to the alleged oral
modification of a construction and lease agreement. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740
P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
—Evidence.
Purchaser of land under an oral contract
seeking to avoid the statute offraudsunder the
doctrine of part performance, based upon his
possession of the land and improvements
thereon, must establish that possession was actual, open, exclusive and with the seller's consent; improvements made were substantial,
valuable and beneficial; a valuable consideration was given in exchange for the conveyance; and all of the foregoing was exclusively
referable to the contract. Coleman v. Dillman,
624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981).
To meet the part performance exception to
the statute offrauds,the terms of the oral contract must be established by clear and definite
evidence. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74
(Utah 1982).
Promissory estoppel.
The elements of promissory estoppel necessary to preclude the operation of this section
were not present in a case where a lessee and a
man claiming to be the lessor entered into an
oral agreement for the lease of property and
the lease was to be reduced to writing by the
lessor but was never written because the lessor
learned of a defect in the chain of title. The
lessee moved on the property and then brought
action against the claimed lessor. The lessee
did not expend any moneys upon the leased
premises, but was damaged because of the loss
of a good bargain. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d
386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956).
Recovery upon quantum meruit or theory
of unjust enrichment.
Where defendant owner entered into oral

agreement to sell described land to plaintiff at
specified price, which was void under this section, and plaintiff thereafter entered into contract to sell same land to third person at profit,
but, when defendant learned of latter contract,
he refused to sell to plaintiff and sold land to
third person for same amount that latter had
agreed to pay plaintiff, plaintiff was not entitled to recover on theory of unjust enrichment
for value of his services in procuring purchaser, even in absence of § 25-5-4(5). Baugh
v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 (1947).
Sale defined.
As applied to land, the word "sale" implies
the creation of an estate in excess of a leasehold, by the act of the owner. Lewis v. Dahl,
108 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362, 160 A.L.R. 1040
(1945).
Settling of accounts.
Defense that agreement by wife to convey
ranch to former husband and herself jointly
was not in writing and thereby void was not
invocable in equity proceedings of settling accounts between the parties where ranch had
been sold and court was concerned only with
distribution of proceeds. Corbet v. Corbet, 24
Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970).
Subscription.
A document to be enforceable under the statute of frauds must be subscribed by the party
granting the conveyance. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).
Surrender, release or discharge.
Surrender of interest under contract for purchase of land could be properly effected without
a deed or conveyance in writing in compliance
with this statute. Budge v. Barron, 51 Utah
234, 169 P. 745 (1917).
Termination or rescission of contract
An agreement to terminate or rescind a contract must be in writing, if the contract that is
extinguished falls within the statute of frauds.
SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d
105 (Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of
Frauds § 59 et 6eq

Key Numbers. — Frauds, Statute of < 71
et seq

25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed.
In the following cases every agreemen^shal) be void unless such agreement,
or so:ne note or memorandum thereof, is injwriting subscribed by the party to
/
be charged therewith:
12

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

25-5-4

(1) Ever} agreement that 1 lis terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making the*
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another.
(3) Every agreement, promisor undertaking made upon consideration
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry.
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or
intestate out of his own estate. /
(5) Every agreer nt authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell rtdl estate (oj compensation
History. R.8.1898 & CX. 1907,1 2467; L.
1909, ch 72, t l;C.L.1917 t $ 5817; R.S. 1933
* C. 1943, S3-M.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
defendant, he must interpose a Special plea of
this statute if statute is to be available as a
Accord and satisfaction
defense. Abba v. Smyth, 21 Utah 109,59 P. 756
Affirmative defense
(1899)
Alteration or modification of original contract
Statute of frauds must be pleaded by party
Assignments
relying upon it as a defense M & S Constr &
Brokerage contracts
Eng'g Co v. Clearfield State Bank, 19 Utah 2d
—Action by broker
86, 426 P.2d 227 (1967)
^-Finder's agreement
Defendant, who answered by a general de—Full} executed contracts
nial and simultaneous motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim as being barred under Subsection
—Procuring lessee
(2) of this section, proceeded improperly, since
—Procuring option
under Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce—Subscription
dure, statute of frauds is not a ground for moCity council minutes
tion to dismiss but rather an affirmative deContract not to be performed within a year
fense under Rule 8(c) W W. & W3 Gardner,
—Automobile rental
Inc v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252
Contract to make will
(1970).
Evidence
—Proving nature of agreement
Alteration or modification of original conPart performance
tract
Promise to recover for another's debt or de
If original contract, to be binding and enfault
forceable, and to aatisf) the statute offrauds,is
—Promisor's own purposee served
required to be in writing and subscribed b\
Recovery upon quantum meruit
parties sought to be charged, then s subse
Revocation or release of agreement to answer quent agreement altering or modifying an} of
for debt of another
IU ma ten a 1 parts or term* is also required to
Stipulation
be in writing and so subscribed no part perforUnilateral contract*
mance or anything done b} such part} in reli
ance on the subsequent agreement being alAccord and satisfaction
Although it IF well settled in Utah that if an leged or proved, especiall} if interest in land IP
©ngmal agreement u within the statute of involved Combined MetaU luc v BasUan,?l
frauds, a subsequent modifying agreement Utah 535, 267 P 1020 (192^
Panie- ma} modif} oralh ar agreement in
muFt also aatiRf) the statute of frauds, an sc
writing *here the original contract is not re
cord and satisfaction IB something entirel} dif
ferent and need not be in writing e\er if the quired by the statute of fraud- to be in writing
onpnal contract wa< mithm the statute of at leact nhere there is consideration for such
frajd Goldtr Ke\ Realt},lnc v Wantas,699 modification But s contract required b} the
statute of frauds to be lr writing cannot be
P.2d 730 (Utah 1*985
modified bv a subsequent a! agreement, si
though thi<. rule IB subject u mar\ cxceptioiiS
Afnrm8tj\e defense
^ iifcn an action if on a contract, admitted b} the first great diMsion coming between execu
ANALYSIS
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70A-8-204

70A-8-203. Staleness as notice of defects or defenses.
(1) After an act or event creating a right to immediate performance of the
principal obligation represented by a certificated security or that sets a date
on or after which the security is to be presented or surrendered for redemption
or exchange, a purchaser is charged with notice of any defect in its issue or
defense of the issuer if:
(a) the act or event is one requiring the payment of money, the delivery
of certificated securities, the registration of transfer of uncertificated securities, or any of these on presentation or surrender of the certificated
security, the funds or securities are available on the date set for payment
or exchange, and he takes the security more than one year after that date;
and
(b) the act %r event is not covered by Subsection (a) and he takes the
security more than two years after the date set for surrender or presentation or the date on which performance became due.
(2) A call that has been revoked is not within Subsection (1).
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-203; 1989, ch.
218, $ 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,1989, inserted "certificated" in the preliminary language of Subsection (1) and twice in Subsection (l)(a), substi-

tuted ''represented" for "evidenced" in the introductory language of Subsection (1), Bubsti-'
tuted "the registration of transfer of uncertificated securities, or any of these" for "or both"
in Subsection (l)(a), and made stylistic
changes throughout.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commercial Code § 81.
C.J.S. — 11 CJ.S. Bonds § 81 et seq.; 18
CJ.S. Corporations §§ 253 et seq., 444; 19
CJ.S. Corporations § 1227 et seq.; 64 CJ.S.

Municipal Corporations § 1965; 81A CJJ.S.
States § 258.
Key Numbers. — Bonds «= 96; Corporations
«= 108, 149, 466 et seq.; Municipal Corporations *= 940 et seq.; States •= 163.

70A-8-204. Effect of issuer's restrictions on transfer.
A restriction on transfer of a security imposed by the issuer, even though
otherwise lawful, is ineffective against any person without actual knowledge
of it unless:
(1) the security is certificated and the restriction is noted conspicuously
on the instrument; or
(2) the security is uncertificated and a notation of the restriction is
contained in the initial transaction statement sent to the person or, if his
interest is transferred to him other than by registration of transfer,
pledge, or release, in the initial transaction statement sent to the registered owner or the registered pledgee.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-204; 1989, ch.
218, | 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 19£9 amendment, effecti\e April 24,1989, rewrote this section, which formerh read *Tmles< noted con-

6picuoush on the BecunU a restriction on
tran?rer imposed b\ the issuer e\en though
otherwise lawful is inefTecti\e except against a
person *ith actual knowledge of it "
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70A-8-301

70A-8-208. Effect of signature of authenticating trustee,
registrar or transfer agent
(1) A person placing his signature upon a certificated security or an initial
transaction statement as authenticating trustee, registrar, transfer agent, or
the like, warrants to a purchaser for value of the certificated security or a
purchaser for value of an uncertificated security to whom the initial transaction statement has been sent, if the purchaser is without notice of the particular defect, that:
(a^ the certificated security or initial transaction statement is genuine;
(b) his own participation in the issue or registration of the transfer,
pledge, or release of the security is within his capacity and within the
scope of the authority received by him from the issuer; and
(c) he has reasonable grounds to believe that the security is in the form
and within the amount the issuer is authorized to issue.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, a person by so placing his signature does not
assume responsibility for the validity of the security in other respects.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, € 8-208; 1989, ch.
218, § 17.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-

ment, effective April 24,1989, so rewrote Subsection (1) as to make a detailed analysis impracticable.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commercial Code § 88.
C.J.S. — 18 CJ.S Corporations §§ 253 et
seq., 444; 19 C J.S. Corporations § 1162 et seq

Key Numbers. — Corporations *=» 108,149,
466 et seq.

PART 3
PURCHASE
70A-8-301. Rights acquired by purchaser.
(1) Upon transfer of a security to a purchaser under Section 70A-8-313, the
purchaser acquires the rights in the security which his transferor had, or had
actual authority to convey unless the purchaser's rights are limited by Subsection 70A-8-302(4).
(2) A transferee of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of
the interest transferred. The creation or release of a security interest in a
security is the transfer of a limited interest in that security.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154,1 S-301; 1989, ch.
216, § 18.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1969, substituted
"transfer of a secunt) to 8 purchaser under
Section 70A-8-313' for "deliver} of a secunt}"
in Subsection (1), substituted Sinless the purchaser's nghu art limited b\ Subsection
70A-8-302.4>' for "except that a purchaser who
has himself beer a part\ to an) fraud or ille
galit) affecting the security or who as prior

holder had notice of an adverse claim cannot
improve his position by taking from a later
bona fide purchaser'1 in Subsection (1), deleted
the former second Bentence of Subsection (1),
construing *ad\erse claim**, deleted former
Subsection (2», which read "A bona fidt purchaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a
purchaser also acquires the security free of am
adverse claim " redesignated former Subsection (3> ac (2), substituted •transferee'" for
"purchaser" and 'transferred* for "purchased*
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70A-8-308

70A-8-307. Effect of delivery without indorsement — Right
to compel indorsement.
If a certificated security in registered form has been delivered to a purchaser without a necessary indorsement he may become a bona fide purchaser
only as of the time the indorsement is supplied, but against the transferor the
transfer is complete upon delivery and the purchaser has a specifically enforceable right to have any necessary indorsement supplied.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-307; 1989, ch.
218, § 24.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,1989, substituted wIf a
certificated security" for "Where a security."

Cross-References. — Documents of title,
delivery without indorsement, right to compel
indorsement, § 70A-7-506.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Failure to indorse certificate.
A seller of stock should be at liberty to protect his certificate from passing into tae hands
of innocent third parties until such time as
payment is tendered and if the certificate is
delivered unconditionally but indorsement is

withheld for security reasons, the failure to indorse does not evidence an intention not to
complete the sale. Taylor v. Daynes, 118 Utah
61,218 P.2d 1069 (1950) (decided under former
Uniform Stock Transfer Act),

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commercial Code § 101.
CJ.S. — 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 253 et
seq., 444; 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1162 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Corporations «=» 108,125,
149, 466 et seq.

70A-8-308. Indorsements — Instructions — "Appropriate
person,"
(1) An indorsement of a certificated security in registered form is made
when an appropriate person signs on it, or on a separate document, an assign- ment or transfer of the security or a power to assign or transfer it, or when the
signature of such person is written without more upon the back of the security.
(2) An indorsement may be in blank or special. An indorsement in blank
includes an indorsement to bearer. A special indorsement specifies to whom
the security is to be transferred, or who has power to transfer it. A holder may
convert a blank indorsement into a special indorsement.
(3) An indorsement purporting to be only of part of a certificated security
representing units intended by the issuer to be separately transferable is
effective to the extent of the indorsement.
(4) (a) An "instruction" is an order to the issuer of an uncertificated security requesting that the transfer, pledge, or release from pledge of the
uncertificated security specified in the instruction be registered.
(b) An instruction originated by an appropriate person is:
(i) a writing signed by an appropriate person; or
(ii) a communication to the issuer in any form agreed upon in
writing, signed by the issuer and an appropriate person.
333
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(5) Any person guaranteeing an indorsement of a certificated security
makes not only the warranties of a signature guarantor under Subsection (1)
but also warrants the rightfulness of the particular transfer in all respects.
(6) Any person guaranteeing an instruction requesting the transfer, pledge,
or release of an uncertificated security makes not only the warranties of a
special signature guarantor under Subsection (3) but also warrants the rightfulness of the particular transfer, pledge, or release in all respects.
(7) An issuer may not require a special guarantee of signature under Subsection (3), a guarantee of indorsement under Subsection (5), or a guarantee of
instruction under Subsection (6), as a condition to registration of transfer,
pledge, or release.
(8) The foregoing warranties are made to any person taking or dealing with
the security in reliance on the guarantee, and the guarantor is liable to the
person for any loss resulting from breach of the warranties.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, S 8-312; 1989, ch.
218, { 29.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsections (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7), renumbering the
existing subsections accordingly; in Subsection
(1), inserted "certificated" in the introductory
language, inserted "under" in Subsection
(1Kb), deleted the final sentence, which read
"But the guarantor does not otherwise warrant
the rightfulness of the particular transfer,"

and made related and punctuation changes; in
Subsection (5), substituted "guaranteeing" for
*may guarantee," "makes" for "and by so doing
warrants," and "guarantor under Subsection
(1)" for "(Subsection 1)," inserted "certificated"
"warranties of a," and "warrants," and deleted
the final sentence, which read "But no issuer
may require a guarantee of indorsement as a
condition to registration of transfer"; and, in
Subsection (8), inserted a comma and substituted "the person" for "such person."

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commercial Code § 103.

C.J.S. — 38 C J.S. Guaranty § 44 et teq.
Key Numbers. — Guaranty «= 27 et seq.

70A-8-313. When transfer to purchaser occurs — Financial intermediary as bona fide purchaser — "Financial intermediary."
(1) Transfer of a security or a limited interest therein, including a security
interest, to a purchaser occurs only:
(a) at the time he or a person designated by him acquires possession of
a certificated security;
(b) at the time the transfer, pledge, or release of an uncertificated security is registered to him or a person designated by him;
(c) at the time his financial intermediary acquires possession of a certificated security specially indorsed to or issued in the name of the purchaser;
(d) at the time his financial intermediary, not a clearing corporation,
sends him confirmation of the purchase and also by book entry' <>r otherwise identifies as belonging to the purchaser:
(i) a specific certificated security in the financial intermediary's
possession;
(ii) a quantity of securities that constitute or are part of a fungible
bulk of certificated securities in the financial intermediary's posses336
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sion or of uncertificated securities registered in the name of the financial intermediary; or
(iii) a quantity of securities that constitute or are part of a fungible
bulk of securities shown on the account of the financial intermediary
on the books of another financial intermediary;
(e) with respect to an identified certificated security to be delivered
while still in the possession of a third person, not a financial intermediary, at the time that person acknowledges that he holds for the purchaser;
(f) with respect to a specific uncertificated security the pledge or transfer of which has been registered to a third person, not a financial intermediary, at the time that person acknowledges that he holds for the purchaser;
(g) at the time appropriate entries to the account of the purchaser, or a
person designated by him, on the books of a clearing corporation are made
under Section 70A-8-320;
(h) with respect to the transfer of a security interest where the debtor
has signed a security agreement containing a description of the security,
at the time a written notification, which, in the case of the creation of the
security interest, is signed by the debtor which may be a copy of the
security agreement or wThich, in the case of the release or assignment of
the security interest created pursuant to this subsection, is signed by the
secured party, is received by:
(i) a financial intermediary on whose books the interest of the
transferor in the security appears;
(ii) a third person, not a financial intermediary, in possession of
the security, if it is certificated;
(iii) a third person, not a financial intermediary, who is the registered owner of the security, if it is uncertificated and not subject to a
registered pledge; or
(iv) a third person, not a financial intermediary, who is the registered pledgee of the security, if it is uncertificated and subject to a
registered pledge;
(i) writh respect to the transfer of a security interest wThere the transferor has signed a security agreement containing a description of the
security, at the time new value is given by the secured party; or
(j) writh respect to the transfer of a security interest wrhere the secured
party is a financial intermediary and the security has already been transferred to the financial intermediary under Subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or
(g), at the time the transferor has signed a security agreement containing
a description of the security and value is given by the secured party.
(2) The purchaser is the owner of a security held for him by a financial
itermediary, but cannot be a bona fide purchaser of a security so held except
i the circumstances specified in Subsections (l)(c), (d)(i), and (g). If a security
) held impart of a fungible bulk as in the circumstances specified in Subsecons (l)(d)(ii) and (D(dKiii), the purchaser is the owner of a proportionate
roperty interest in the fungible bulk.
(3) Notice of an adverse claim received by the financial intermediary or by
le purchaser after the financial intermediary takes delivery of a certificated
3curity as a holder for value or after the transfer, pledge, or release of an
ncertificated security has been registered free of the claim to a financial
itermediary who has given value is not effective either as to the financial
339

...

UNIFORM COMlton-,
n ,M

•»35.

-

' * 8 ^ J 8 , 1 9 8 9 , ch.

* n i f i c 2 l c d «curiUe.c over

^

f ^ W * l . v e r , p u r s ^ «« * * f *
**"• * bill .f lading, S!i%uthaat
*+

NOTES TO hry,,,.

_ *"-«J.S. —» 94

r

,„

**)' ^'umbers

ft) ^ m y V S ^ ^ - W

lUn

£ £ ? «*<* W * of descnW

fc i within a reaso^M *.pa>^ent; «•

""* P 1 **™ only to the

iil~f #~ - J V16 Party ataine* „.t. ™ ! r "wferPaiMw*. /-Ti "fe'
receipt, or
, « ) the p a r t j
•
^ w « a « i » da>6 «fter *

K

°T£s TO aasioxs

ur

a

Oral~l7i
* fwnem.
v/rfi/ c.O.G "«irra».

,

344

•

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
agreement was made; (2) by the debtor/obligor
of the settlement agreement (or by a third
party at the debtor's direction); and (3) the payment was made to the creditor under the settlement agreement. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744
P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

78-12-45

Verbal agreement.
A verbal agreement or new promise based
upon a prior agreement barred by statute
comes within this section. Whitehill v. Lowe,
10 Utah 419, 37 P. 589 (1894) (decided under
prior law).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 325 et seq.
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 261.
A.L.R. — Promises to settle or perform as
estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 44
A.L.R.3d 482.

Promises or attempts by seller to repair
goods as tolling statute of limitations for
breach of warranty, 68 A.L.R.3d 1277.
Key Numbers. — Limitations of Actions «=
146.

78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here.
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or territory, or in a
foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon
shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who
has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of actionfromthe
time it accrued.
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-45.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
—Counterclaim.
Act occurring in other state.
Choice of laws.
—Utah court.
Exception to section.
—Assignee of resident's claim.
—State resident.
Accrual of cause of action.
Applicability of section.
This section is a general provision applying
to causes of action that arise in a different
state and are not reduced to judgment. Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1991).
—Counterclaim.
Act occurring in other state.
Where defendant's counterclaim for malpractice occurring in Idaho was barred by the
Idaho statute of limitation, it would be barred
here under this section. Lindsav v. Woodward,
5 Utah 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619(1956).
Choice of laws.
—Utah court.
In wrongful death action by Utah resident

against Colorado residents, in which Utah
court had quasi in rem jurisdiction, Utah court
applied Utah law on matter concerning the
statute of limitations, including the tolling
thereof. Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343 (Utah
1980), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct.
397, 70 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1981).
Exception to section.
—Assignee of resident's claim.
Resident of Utah, who acquired claim upon
which he based his right of action by virtue of
assignment after cause of action had accrued
thereon, did not come within exception to this
section. Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28,95 P. 520
(1908).
—State resident.
Accrual of cause of action.
Only those persons who are Utah residents
as of the date their cause of action arises come
within the exception to this section Allen v.
Greyhound Lines, 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978).
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EXEMPTIONS
continued
to extent that contributions thereto were tax exempt, plus interest or dividends) are
exempt from all liabiht) from debt except for ahmon) and child support But no
contribution to such fund is exempt if made within one year offilingfor bankruptcy or
within one year of filing of wnt of seizure Mgamst such plan (T 20, §3311), •* * r n ' d
Act 362 of 1983) All gratuitous pa>ments made b> employers to employees or former
employees or their widows heirs or beneficiaries are also exempt from all but alimony and child support obligations (T 20, §33[2])
Homestead Exemption —See topic Homesteads
FACTORS
Ar> factor, broker, commission merchant, middleman or other person or corpora
tion acting as commission merchant, or undertaking to sell for another any goods,
wares, merchandise sugar, cotton nee, or any other agricultural produce, must render a true and correct account of the sales thereof within fifteen days of the date of
said sales, which statement must give the name and address of the person or corpora
tion to whom sold and dates of said sales (T 51 §5) Cotton merchants purchasing
from farmers must register with Commissioner of Agriculture and provide bond of
$50 000 (T 3, §700 et seq , as am'd Act 888 of 1985)
Bond —Commission merchants who sell in this state on commission or bu> as
agent or broker an> farm products fish oysters shrimp crabs game or fur skins must
furnish bond to Commissioner of Agriculture, etc , in the sum of $1000 (T 51, §§14)
False Statements, Etc —It is misdemeanor to render a false statement or account of
a sale of cotton or other agricultural product or falsel) to represent that such prod
nets are held for future sale when sold, or when the) are held on consignment, to sell,
without rendering a complete account, showing price, grade, and name and address of
purchaser, or with intent to defraud consignor, to make a false charge, report of
condition, or statement (T 3, §500)
lien.—Factor has ben on movables entrusted to him for sale and on proceeds and
unpaid purchase money, which is pnor to ben of attachment If facur becomes insolvent, consignor may reclaim goods consigned or if sold has ben on unpaid price
thereof (C C 3247-8)
Recordation of Contracts —There are no provisions as to filing or recording consignment agreements or notices of factors' bens
Business license tax levied on all factorage, brokerage or commission businesses
ranges from a minimum of S30 when the gross annual commissions are less than
$5,000 to a maximum of $4,000 when such commissions are $500,000 or more, twenty-two classes bang provided for (T 47, c 3)
FILING FEES
See topics Chattel Mortgages, Corporations, Records
FORECLOSURE
See topics Liens, Mortgages of Real Property
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
See topics Corporations, Insurance
FRANCHISES:
No special legislation Uniform Franchise and Business Opportunities Act not
adopted
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF
See also topic Commercial Code
No statute as such Analogous provision* are
Transfer of immovable property must be in writing but if a verbal sale or other
disposition of such propert) be made it is good against the vendor and vendee who
confesses it when interrogated on oath provided actual delivery has been made of the
immovable (C C 2275)
Sale of movables verbal!) is valid but all verba1 agreements relative to movable
propert) and al' verbal contracts for pavment of mone> mhere value is in execs* of
S \ T ma> be proved b> two or more witnesses or one witness and other corroborative
circumstances (C C 2277, 2441) Verba1 sale of movables mithout delivery cannot
a
TIEhts of third persons (C C 224")
Parol evidence i^ no' received to prove an\ promise to pa\ (1) A judgmen* of am
coun in oi ou* of thi* state for the purpose of taking same out o f prescription or
irvn ing it after prescription has rur (2) an) debt or liability of one deceased in order
to take it out of prescription or to revive it after prescription ha* run (3) the deb of
a third perso (4) an\ debt or haMlitv evidenced b> anting when prescription ha<>
alreadv rur 1 u' in all these case*, the acknowledgment or promise^ mu^ be in anting
signed b) tht pan> to be bound or bs hiv agcrt or attornc) m fact speciall) authorized in wnting so to do (C C 227*)
FRAUDULENT S\LES AND C O W E i ANCES
Annulment —Obligee has right to annual act of obligor or result o r failure to act of
oblige mad* or e ^ t e d after ngV of o^'igee arov tha causes or ircrease* oblige s
m^Uenr) (C C 20H ef Ja- 1 19e<; Obligor deemed invoHc-' mher total of
liabilities exceed^ tou' of fair Is appra sed assets (CC 20V, ef Jar 1 198<) Ob
g c mas annul onerous contract und* cenair conditions (C C 20^8 eff Ja^ 1,
19fc*) Oblige* ma\ attack gratuitous cor »-act mad* b) obligor whe'he or not other
p a r , io cortra t knew tha contract mould cause or increase obliges insolvent
(C C 20^9 ef Jar 1 1 9 ^ ) Actior of obligee must be brought wuhir one year fror
time he learned or should have learned of act o failure to ac< bu' not more thar three
yea-v from act (C C 2041 cf Jar 1, 198<) Oohgee mav no annul contract of
ob'igor in regJa' course of business (C C 204C ef Jan 1, 198<) Obligee must )oir
See no" a* head of Dige^- a t

obligor and third persons who can plead discussion of obligor's assets (C C 2 0 o r f
Jan 1, 1985) If obligor-establishes right to annul such right is exercised onh^
extent that it affects obligees rights ( C C 2043, eff Jan 1, 1985) Obugt*^
exercise obligor's right when he refuses to do so, unless it is strictly personal, if < j ^
causes or increases insolvency by hi* refusal (C C 2044, eff Jan 1, 1985) ^ * *
Bulk Sales —Transfer m bulk and not in ordinary course of trade of a porooa *
whole of merchandise or merchandise and fixtures or substantial^ all fixtitna *
trucks or vehicles is void as to transferor s creditors unless detailed inventory ^ ^
ten da>s before transfer, publication or notice of date, place and time of sale in j a ^
journal of parish at least 15 da)$ before transfer, and transferee gets sworn «**irifr11
of creditors with addresses and indebtedness, notifies each personall) or by cerow
or registered mail, ten days before transfer, and sees that purchase price goes io • *
bona fide creditors Otherwise transferee must pa> fair value to creditors Misdea^
or for transferor not to give full and complete statement to transferee (T 9, §2941 at
am'd Act 584 of 1985)
Under Bulk Sales Lau "creditors" include onl> creditors for debts owed b> tra*
feror before transfer, and not for debts arising afterwards By special provisiat, *,
collector is included among creditors (T 9, §2961, as am'd Act 379 of 1985)
See also topic Taxation subnead Payment
GARNISHMENT:
Caveat Fuentes v Shevin, 407 U S 67, 92 S Cl 1983, 32 L Ed 2d 556 (197:)
held notice and an opportunit) to a heanng pnor to seizure of property consuiuuc**,
Jy essential under due process clause
Garnishment process ma) be issued in aid of attachment, if the attaching endacr
has reason to believe that a third person has possession of mone> or other proper*
belonging to the defendant The process with appropriate interrogatories aua. *
served on the third person (C C P 2412)
Garnishment process ma> also be used m aid of execution of a judgment MOB* §
wnt of fieri facias ( C C P 2411)
JZ
'
Reply of Garnishee—Within 15 days (five days tn City Court) after aenwe*
citation and interrogatories, the garnishee must file sworn answers thereto,ctnwat
there is prima facie case made against him that he is indebted to defendant tatmmm
of claim plus costs, and interest ( C C P 2412, 2413) Interrogatories serve&cup ,
Bishee must include questions which when answered will inform court ^ t o ^ P * j£
defendant debtor is employed by garnishee, his wage rate, manner paid, aafltjjlkj*
judgments or garnishments, if no longer employed, where and by whomAawa
presently employed and residing if known to garnishee (T 13, §3924,«am1B£e
532 of 1982)
J*,
Traverse of Repl>.—The reply of the garnishee may be traversed by the attdaaaj
creditor and the issue raised is tned by the court ( C C P 2414) Traverse of npK*
garnishee must be made within 15 days after service of notice of reply on pany aaaa*
garnishment ( C C P 2414)
Seizure —If garnishee declare m his reply that be has propert), etc ,of debtor«fc
possession, the court can order that it be turned over to shenff or constable, as tirsat
ma) be
^ages, salary, etc, ma) be garnished, tn which case the court, after a beanqg.%w
the portion which is exempt (sec Exemptions) and provides for payment lojfreja*
lushing creditor out of the balance Indebtedness to emplo)er ma) be grvenfpjg
over garnishment (T 13, §§3921-3927) N o person lending mone) at moretbaajP^j;
per annum ma) garnish an) legally exempt salary or wages of debtor m a M p - j E ^
force payment of debt, under penalt) of imprisonment (T 20, §32) ^ ° r * e r a * J S »
be discharged because of single garnishment, and ha<> remed) forranstateaseaMK„
back pa) Worker ma) be discharged if earnings are subjected to three o r y ^ y
nishments for unrelated debts in two-year penods other than garnishment *****
from accident or illness causing loss of ten or more consecutive days at worVfJ-3*
§731. as am'd Act 204 of 198^
See topic Exemptions subhead Earnings
' *2*
jr.*

GUARDIAN AND VNARD
^ j3
Persons Entitled to Tutorship —Dunng marriage father is administrator^^" 1
estate and mother when father is mentally incompetent committed mter&w,
pnsoned or an absentee (CC 221 C C P 4501 C C P 4502 as arr d *&*zL
1975) Parents enjo) usufruct of minor's estate but nght does not extend toiujjjjp
to child unlesv specincalh so provided m donatior (C C 226 as am'd ***7*^»
198<) Mother is tutnx of illegitimate child not acknowledged b> fatrrf o ' t » * r
edged b) him without he' concurrence If both ha\e acknowledged court «*eca
as tutor (CC 256 as am'd Act 215 of 198^) Pa-ems of mother are con*dr*f
on death of mother of illegitimate who has not been acknowledged bv f»*h^ f*An 536 as am'd Act 536 of 1979)
^ ^ ^
Upon death of either parent tutorship of minor children belong* °f n * n \ $ * - ^ %
mg pa^er but survivor muM qualif\ as provided b> hiw (C C 24f a< am ^
of 1960) Father or mothc d\mg last orpa-entwrc iv cura'or c/sp"-^*** - ^
a tutor b) mill o' b) having made a decla*atn- bet ore deatl executes bHort i ^ ^
public and two witnesses (C C 2^) Judge ma for good reason* re'ov *fJJ?£
tutorship given b) surviving father or mo'her and appoint someon- e l * J ^ J j i j a
€
itead ( C C P 4062) Whe- tutor has no been appointed b\ fathr^^3SB^t
las or if tutor is not confiTned or is excused tutor appointed rrorT" " " ^ ^ H B P ^
$aTVT
ascendant^ in direct line collaterals b) bl'XK? with r third deg te and
TfS^T
of minor s father or mother d)ing la* (C C Act 26* as arr d Act 4 ^ J * ^£T
there is no ascendan' nearest of kir m collatera' line is entitled tc tutor***
A minor not emancipated is placed unde a tuto' after dissolu* ^n o^maji-^ ^
parents or ther sepa-atior from bed and boa'd (C C l c " and 24t ^ ^ a*
nag' fathers and mother have enjovmem of estate of the ' children b u 1 ^ ^ p O
propen) belonging to childrer cannot be sold or mortgaged or an\ othe s t ^ . | g g regard io it except with same formalities as are presenbed in case of minors W
oc
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9. Breach of marriage promise
When there is no dispute as to the fact
that the promise of marriage was made
within one year before filing suit, the court
properly refused to charge upon the issue
made by the plea of limitation. Daggett v.
Wallace (1890) 75 T. 352, 13 S.W. 49.
A suit to establish a trust against a house
and lot was not barred by one year statute
of limitations governing actions for breach
of promise of marriage, although plaintiff
testified that defendant stated they would
be married, where it could not be said as a
matter of law when the promise of marriage, if any, was breached. Davis v. Clements (Civ.App.1951) 239 S.W.2d 657, ref.
n.r.e.
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 5524 (repealed;
now, this section) which barred actions for
breach of promise to marry not brought
within one year from accrual of cause of
action did not bar action to cancel a deed
procured by promise to marry, which was
allegedly breached. Hooks v. Brown (Civ.
App.1961) 348 S.W.2d 104, ref. n.r.e.
In action for breach of promise of marriage, wherein defendant pleaded Vernon's
Ann.Civ.St. art. 5524 (repealed; now, this
section) as defense, fact issue existed upon
the resolution of which the validity of plea
of limitation would depend, precluding sum-

was barred by one-year limitation. Seven
One Seven Tire Service v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. (Civ.App.1927) 288 S.W. 558.
Debtor's alleged cause of action for slander against creditor for words uttered by
creditors agent upon failure of debtor to
pay indebtedness did not arise out of the
same transaction which was the basis for
creditor's suit for debt, and debtor's cross
action was barred by the one-year statute
of limitations. Swaim v. International Harvester Co. (Civ.App.1974) 505 S.W.2d 634,
ref. n.r.e.
Debtor's mention in his answer filed in
suit on indebtedness that debtor intended to
file cross action for damages for slander did
not protect debtor so that his later-filed suit
by way of cross action praying for recover}'
of damages flowing therefrom was not subject to creditor's limitation plea. Swaim v.
International Harvester Co. (Civ.App. 1974)
505 S.W.2d 634, ref. n.r.e.
11. Summary judgment
Defendant who establishes in summary
judgment proceeding the applicability of a
statute of limitations is entitled to prevail
unless plaintiff comes forward with proof
showing some excuse for delay. McClelland v. Peterson (Civ.App.1973) 494 S.W.2d
583.

§ 16.003. Two-Year Limitations Period
(a) A person must bring suit for trespass for injury to the estate or to
the property of another, conversion of personal property, taking or
detaining the personal property of another, personal injury, forcible
entry and detainer, and forcible detainer not later than two years after
the day the cause of action accrues.
(b) A person must bring suit not later than two years after the day the
cause of action accrues in an action for injury resulting in death. The
cause of action accrues on the death of the injured person.
Revisor's Note
(1) The revised law omits the reference to firms and public and
private corporations in the source law. The Code Construction Act
(V.A.C.S. Article 5429b-2) includes business entities and governmental
entities within the definition of "person."
(2) The revised law omits the source law material that provides for
suits to be brought within two years of the effective date of V.A.C.S.
Article 5526a (March 7, 1934) because the two-year period has expired.
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by which statute might be tolled. Phipps v.
Chrysler Corp. (Civ.App.1970) 460 S.W.2d
170, error refused.
Where plaintiff in personal injury and
property damage suit admitted doing nothing to have citation both issued and served
upon one defendant, a resident of county in
which suit was brought, from period December 19, 1967 to November, 1969, plaintiff did not exercise due diligence, and his
excuse that he feared being brought to trial
without both defendants being in court and
possibility of dismissal for want of prosecution pending service on another defendant
was insufficient to toll statute of limitation.
Green v. Steigerwald (Civ.App.1971) 468
S.W.2d 122.
Under Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 5526 (repealed; now, this section), mere filing of
suit would not interrupt running of statute
of limitations; to interrupt running of statute, not only must petition have been filed
but use of due diligence in procuring issuance and service of citation was required.
Walker v. Hanes (Civ.App. 1978) 570 S.W.2d
534, ref. n.r.e.
Due diligence in procuring issuance of
citation and its service upon defendant was
not established so as to interrupt or toll
running of two-year period of limitations in
action for property damage arising from
automobile collision where delay on part of
plaintiff in seeking issuance of an alias citation for a period in excess of six months

was unexplained. Hamilton v. Goodson
(Civ.App.1979) 578 S.W.2d 448.
Where after plaintiff in personal injury
action requested clerk to issue citation for
defendant, which was returned unserved,
there was total inaction by plaintiff during
17-month period after expiration of limitations period before service was completed,
with no additional attempts to obtain service and attempt to determine whether service was completed, there was lack of diligence by plaintiff in procuring issuance
and service of citation, and thus, statute of
limitations was not tolled and barred plaintiffs action. Reynolds v. Alcorn (Civ.App.
1980) 601 S.W.2d 785.
442.

Dismissal, tolling statute of limitations
Where former wife's first suit for partition of former husband's military retirement benefits was dismissed for want of
prosecution, that suit did not interrupt running of statute of limitations. Shaw v. Corcoran (Civ.App.1978) 570 S.W.2d 96.
443. Review, tolling statute of limitations
Where patient did not urge to trial court
issues of whether statute of limitations on
medical malpractice claim was tolled based
on discovery rule or fraudulent concealment, patient failed to preserve for appeal
complained of error'in grant of physician's
summary judgment motion based on limitations defense. Jean v. Jones (App. 1 Dist.
1983) 663 S.W.2d 56, ref. n.r.e.

§ 16.004. Four-Year Limitations Period
(a) A person must bring suit on the following actions not later than
four years after the day the cause of action accrues:
(1) specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of real
property;
(2) penalty or damages on the penal clause of a bond to convey real
property; or
(3) debt.
(b) A person must bring suit on the bond of an executor, administrator, or guardian not later than four years after the day of the death,
resignation, removal, or discharge of the executor, administrator, or
guardian.
(c) A person must bring suit against his partner for a settlement of
partnership accounts, and must bring an action on an open or stated
account, or on a mutual and current account concerning the trade of
merchandise between merchants or their agents or factors, not later than
1 V.T.C.A.Gv.Prac. & Rem.Code—16
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four years after the day that the cause of action accrues. For purposes
of this subsection, the cause of action accrues on the day that the
dealings in which the parties were interested together cease.
Historical Note
Prior Law:
G.L. vol. 8, p. 938.
,OA.
„0
Rev.Civ.St.1895, arts. 3356, 3357, 3360.
c
* }* }%]* L l
™
Rev.Civ.St.1911, arts. 5688, 5689, 5692.
P.D. 137o, 3923, 4604.
A c t s 1917> 3 5 t h ^
3 r d C .S., p. 87.
Acts 1876, p. 102.
Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1769, ch. 716, § 2.
G.L. vol. 2, p. 627.
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. arts. 5527, 5528,
Rev.Civ.St.1879, arts. 3205, 3206, 3209.
5531.
Cross References
Bonds of public officers, actions on, see Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 6003a.
Statute of limitations in contracts for sale, see V.T.C.A. Bus. & C. § 2.725.
Law Review Commentaries
Analysis of 1979 amendments to DecepImplied warranty of habitability: Contive Trade Practices Act. Robert E. Good- tract or tort? 31 Baylor LRev. 207 (1979).
friend and Michael P. Lynn, 33 Southwest.
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ern LJ. (Tex, 999 (1979).
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Annual survey of Texas law:
Civil procedure. Ernest E. Figari, Jr., Jf***™Im
^ l , * * * 6
^ ^
34 Southwestern LJ. (Tex.) 415 34 Baylor LRev. 269 (1982).
(1980).
Professional malpractice: Extent of liabilProperty insurance. Arno W. Krebs, ity in Texas and elsewhere. Steven K.
Jr., and Otway B. Denny, Jr., 35 Ward, 42 Texas Bar J. 117 (1979).
Southwestern LJ. (Tex.) 256 (1981).
Purchase and sales of real property.
Security deposits with utilities. 21 SouthLawrence J. Brannian, 35 Southwest- western LJ. (Tex.) 857 (1967).
ern LJ. (Tex.) 53 (1981).
Statutory damages recovery: Uninsured
Secured transactions. John Krahmer
Howard L. Nations, 18
mo torist statute.
e S t € r n LJ
L ,
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South Texas LJ. 329 (1977).
(1980).

Support. Ellen K. Solender, 35 Southwestern LJ. (Tex.) 163 (1981).
Wills. Charles 0. Galvin, 34 Southwestern LJ. (Tex.) 21 (1980).

Uninsured motorist coverage: Relief in
Texas from financially irresponsible motorist. David J. Beck, 32 Texas Bar J. 93
(1969).
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TEXAS LAW DlUfcSi
^
continued
l^\or*s Lien.—See topic Commercial Code.
j^ment Lien.—See topic Judgments.
dlord's Uen.—See topic Landlord and Tenant.
IMS on Exempt Property.—See topic Exemptions.
oo Homestead.—See topic Homesteads.
I**
_ j Estate Mortgage Lien.—See topic Mortgages of Real Property.
f n Lien.—See topic Taxation.
UMTTATIONOF ACTIONS:
inform Commercial Code enacted. (Bus. & Comm. C. Title 1). See topic Com^^ctt! Code
anions must be brought within following times:
Tn rears: on judgments, domestic or foreign, except that foreign judgment barred
• y entered in less than ten years is barred likewise in this state (Civ. P. Rem. Code
l • 0t*{&]); action to recover land, when instrument of record is defective in certain
n^-ulars such as record not showing seal of officer taking acknowledgment, or
i^rumeni not being signed by proper officer, etc. (Civ. P, Rem Code §16.033); to
^ncr damages arising out of defective or unsafe conditions of real property against
av r«rfonning construction or repair thereto (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.009); to recovc d*mapes caused by error in survey conducted by registered public surveyor or
txcsed state land surveyor, except if written claim presented during ten-year period,
* ~ period extended two years from date claim presented. (Civ. P. Rem. Code
|lt011).
fto years: action on officer's bond for failure to make return of execution. (Civ. P.
ICE Code §16.007).
fts? years: actions for debt; actions for penalty or for damages on penal clause of
ttad to convey real estate; actions by one partner against his co-partner for settlement
* l»rmership accounts, actions upon stated or open accounts, or upon mutual and
a%rect accounts concerning trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant,
4tor (actors or agents; and cause of action shall be considered as having accrued on
Wmuion of dealings in which they were interested together (Civ. P. Rem. Code
fit004); on notes secured by deeds, mortgages, or deeds of trust, or vendor's bens
•tamed in deeds of conveyance, or vendor's hen notes for purchase money, time
mumf from maturity of debt (Ci*. P. Rem. Code $16,035); for specific performance
* contracts to convey real estate (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16 004[a] [ 1 ]); suits on bond
rf executor, administrator or guardian, time running from death, resignation, removal
m discharge of executor, etc. (Civ. P. Rem. Code § 16.004 [b]); on all causes not
•Wrrise specified (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.051). See also topic Commercial Code. As
* Kits for defalcation on bonds of public officials, see 6003a.
•Vte years: by or against carriers of property for hire for charges or overcharges,
ffcv p. Rem. Code §16.006).
two years: for injuries to person or property; for death, time running from death;
** detaining personal property and converting same to own use, for taking or carry^ iway goods or chattels of another; for forcible entry and detainer (Civ. P. Rem.
fctfe §16.003); will contests (Prob. C. §93).
Ox yean for injuries to character or reputation; for malicious prosecution, seduc* * or breach of promise to marry. (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.002).
Sii aionths: actions under bulk transfer provisions of U.C.C.
Extension of Limitations Period.—If last day of limitations period under any stat•* of limitations falls on Sat., Sun., or holiday, period for filing suit is extended to
*=*•• day that county offices are open for business. (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.072).
**• Action.—When an action is dismissed or judgment set aside or annulled in a
~ « proceeding because of lack of jurisdiction of trial court, and within 60 days
•Rafter action is commenced in proper court, period between date of first filing and
**' of commencement of action in proper court is not counted as pan of period of
•^'•itJon, unless first filing was intentional disregard of jurisdiction. (Civ. P. Rem.
^•§16.064).
^•reigr Causes of Action.—No statutory provision regarding foreign causes of
w* LT ** owevcr ' anions based upon foreign judgment or decree are barred if by laws
toragr state or country such action would there be barred and judgment or decree
*&=»pab!e of being otherwise enforced there; and whether so barred or not, no action
jr*;riSi person who shall have resided in this State during ten years next preceding
~ ^ action shall be brought upon any such judgment or decree rendered more than
years before commencement of such action (Civ. P. Rem Code §16.066).
^©nihilities °f Plaintiff.—Time does not run against insane persons, persons under
^.*ea-5> of age, or during war, as to real estate against persons in military or naval
^>«* of federal government, handicapped persons who because of handicap are
••* to determine thai property is under adverse possession, or elderly persons who
•*^e of advanced age are unable to determine that property is under adverse posor. but no action to recover real property may be brought more than 25 years
"5J*USC accrued. (Civ. P. Rem Code §§16.001, 16.022, 16.027).
"eath.—in case of death of person against whom or in whose favor a cause of
^x- exists, time ceases to run until 12 months after such death, unless an adminis. 7 ° r executor sooner qualifies, in which case time ceases to run only until such
* * ^ : i o n (Civ P. Rem Code §16.062).
en
1 ^J* ce or Concealment of Defendant.—The time during which a defendant is
i.» / fr°m the state is deducted from the penod of limitation (Civ. P. Rem Code
^r^terclaim or Cross Action.—If at time required by law for answer to plaintiffs
t*. r' defendant's counterclaim or cross action would otherwise be barred by applig^- statute °f limitation, penod of limitations is extended 30 days following answer
" ^ 0r counterclaim or cross action arising out of same transaction or occurence
:
Object matter of opposing parry's claim (Gv. P. Rem Code §lo.069)

Revival of Barred Claims.—A debt barred by limitation may be revived only b>
acknowledgment in writing, signed by person to be charged. (Civ. P. Re m . Ci
§16.065). Judgment where no execution issued within 12 months after rendition n
be revived by scire facias or action of debt brought within ten years. (Civ. p R (
Code §31.006).
Extension of maturity of any evidence of indebtedness secured by mortgage, deec
trust or vendor's lien on real property must be in writing, signed, acknowledged, :
recorded, as in case of a mortgage. (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.036).
Contractual Limitations.—Time within which to sue may not be limited by c
tract to less than two years unless contract is for sale of business entity anc j
aggregate vaJue not less than $500,000 (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.070), and eXcer
extent permitted under Uniform Commercial Code. See topic Commercial Code. C
tractua! stipulation requiring claimant to give notice of claim of damages as c0nd
precedent to right to sue must be reasonable. Notification period of less than 9rj <L
void. Notice is presumed unless lack of notice is specifically pleaded under oath e>
where contract is for sale of business entity and has value not less than $500,000 (
P. Rem. Code §16.071).
Pleading.—To be available as a defense limitations must be pleaded. (Rule 9Immigrants may not be sued on causes of action barred in state or country
which they emigrated prior to emigration. Action not barred at time of rernov
Texas is not barred until immigrant has resided in state for one year. (Civ. p ]
Code §16.067).
See also topic Adverse Possession.
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP: See Partnership.
MARRIAGE.
Person under 18 years may not marry without: (i) consent of parent or guard
(ii) court order. Person under 14 years may not marry without court order. (Fa
§§1.51-1.53).
Medical Examination.—No statutory provision.
license required, it is procured from any county clerk. (Fam. C. §1.07).
parties must appear in person unless county judge waives requirement of pe
appearance. (Fam. C. §1.02). License becomes invalid unless marriage has bee
ducted within 30 days after license issued. (Fam. C §§1.81).
Hairing Period.—No statutory provision.
Ceremonial marriage may be performed by: licensed or ordained Christian rr
or priest; Jewish rabbi; officer of religious organization authorized by organic
perform marriage ceremonies; justice of peace; judge of any court of record. j
justice of peace nor judge of any court of record can discriminate on basis (
religion, or national origin. (Fam. C §1.83).
Reports of Marriages.—Clerk records all licenses issued. Person solemnize
of matrimony must endorse same on license and return it to county clerk wi
days after celebration; return is recorded with license. (Fam. C. §1.84).
Record.—-Sec topic Records, subhead Vital Statistics.
Common law marriages, both local and out-of-state, are recognized. (191
495; Fam. C §1.91-95).
Proxy Marriages.—Ceremonial marriage performed by a proxy under p
attorney, where couple was separated by military service, is legal marriage, a
band can be guilty of offense of desertion. (Op. Atty. Gen. 1946, No. 0-7529
Marriages by Written Contract.—No statutory provision
Prohibited Marriages.—Person may not marry his or her aunt or uncle, ne
niece (including half-blood or by adoption) or any nearer relative by consar
or stepparent or stepchild. Such marriages are void (Fam C. §2.21).
Foreign marriage recognized unless contrary to policy of state.
Annulment.—A marriage may be annulled for natural or incurable imp^
the time of entering into the marriage contract, or for any other impedir
renders such contract voidable. (Fam C. §§2.41-.46). Statutory time limk
annulment for nonage is 90 days after date of marriage. (Fam. C. §2.41).
MARRIED WOMEN:
See topics Dower; Executors and Administrators, Homesteads; Husband .
Marriage, Wills, Witnesses.
MASTER AND SERVANT:
See topic Labor Relations; also Principal and Agent.
MECHANICS' LIENS: See Liens
MINES AND MINERALS.
Operation of Mines.—-Note: 5901 -5920a, governing health and safet>
were repealed by 19SQ H.B 863. Department of Licensing and Regulation
govern (9100). Statute is unclear
Safeguarding of Employees.—Rules of safety formerly governed by 5
Occupational Safety Board can enact safet\ rules applicable to industry
(5182a).
Inspection of Mines.—See subhead Operation of Mines, supra
Oil and Gas—Railroad Commission has duty of enforcing statutory reg
oil and gas industry, which include extensive conservation laws (N.R.C
leases on state lands must provide that no gas will be sold for use outside s
permission from Texas Railroad Commission is obtained and any lease no:
tng is void (N.R.C. §§52.292-52.296) Railroad Commission is authorize,:
pooling of mineral interests for oil and gas well under certain conditior
§102) Railroad Commission is authorized to approve designation by d^
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Dear Customer,
We have received from you certificates for the securities indicated below. However in order to process
them and make good delivery it is necessary that the power of assignment bearing your signature be
attached to the certificate(s) since it does not bear your endorsement. Therefore will you please sign
the power below and return it to us in the enclosed envelope.
Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

IRREVOCABLE STOCK OR BOND POWER

Jf or Value iUceibcb,

£

^

r

t

the undersigned does (do) hereby sell, assign and transfer to

£L £LL

ns.
(SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAXPAYER ID NUMBER/

'OMPLETE

1^ V ^ °

sharps of thp g o m r ^ o ^

stork of

7) \ <>L ' j * r (X f\

->yS-fer^/t

HIS PORTION

J represented by certificate (s ) N n ( s ) .
293?
standing in the name of the undersigned on the books of said Company.

Jnf

inclusive,

.bonds of.

F BONDS,
JOMPLETE
HIS PORTION
\

.No(s).
in the principal amount of $.
standing in the name of the undersigned on the books of said Company.
The undersigned does (do) hereby irrevocably constitute and appoint

.inclusive,

attorney to transfer
the said stock or bond(s), as the case may be, on the books of said Company, with full
power of substitution in the premises.
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

IMPORTANT: The signature(s) to this power must correspond
with the name(s) as written upon the face of the certificate(s)
or bond(s) in every particular without alteration.

^yy^tTy*^

Tyr^Jh//^

TITLE WHICH APPEARS ON CERTIFICATE

TITLE WHICH APPEARS ON CERTIFICATE

(PERSON(S) EXECUTING THIS POWER SIGN(S) HERE)

Account No.

|

P^FTCTIFFS
EXHIBIT

Dated

A
CODE 132 REV. 12/76 PRINTED IN U.S.A.

THE CORPORATION WILL FURNISH WITHOUT CHARGE TO EACH STOCKHOLDER WHO ,
SO REQUESTS THE POWERS. DESIGNATIONS, PREFERENCES AND RELATIVE, PARTICI- '
PATING, OPTIONAL OR OTHER SPECIAL RIGHTS OF EACH CLASS OF STOCK OR SERIES
THEREOF AND THE QUALIFICATIONS, LIMITATIONS OR RESTRICTIONS OF SUCH PREFERENCES AND/OR RIGHTS.
Tlje following abbreviations, when used m the inscription on the face of this certificate, shall be construed as though
they were written out in full according to applicable laws or regulations:
TEN C0M

- as tenants in common

TEN ENT

— as tenants by the entirety

JT TEN

I M F GIFT MIN ACT—

Custodian
(Cust)
(.Minor)
under Uniform Gifts to Minors

— a- joint tenants with nwh* of
survivorship and not as truants
Act
in common
(State)
Additional abbreviations may also be used though not in the above list.

S

P L E A S E INSCWT S O C I A L S E C U R I T Y O » O T H E R
I D E N T I F Y I N G K C M B E * * OR A S S I G N E E

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPEWRITE NAME AND ADDRESS INCLUDING POSTAL ZIP CODE OF ASSIGNEE

~r>
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SIGNATURE GUARANTEED

"THE SHARES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED
UNDER EITHER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED, OR APPLICABLE
BLUE SKY LAVS. THEY MAY NOT BE SOLD, OFFERED FOR SALE OR TRANSFERRED
IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE REGISTRATION UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933, AS AMENDED, AND THE APPLICABLE BLUE SKY LAVS OR AN OPINION
OF COUNSEL SATISFACTORY IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE TO COUNSEL FOR THE
COMPANY' THAT SUCK TRANSACTION WILL NOT RESULT IN A PROHIBITED
TRANSACTION UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED, OR THE
APPLICABLE BLUE SKY LAVS."

m^'w^w-wom

INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DIGITRAN SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED
THIS CERTIFIES
F49999
HT

THAT

***LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS***

SEE REVERSE SIDE
FOR CERTAIN DEFINITIONS

is the owner of

***THIRTY TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY***
FULLY PAID AND NON-ASSESSABLE SHARES OF COMMON STOCK, $.01 PAR VALUE, OF
DIGITRAN SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED ^ = ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ =

transferable on the books of the Corporation by the holder hereof in person or by duly authorized attorney on surrender of
this certificate properly endorsed. This certificate is not valid unless countersigned by the Transfer Agent and Registrar.
WITNESS the facsimile signatures of the Corporation *s duly authorized officers.

Dated:

04/27/87

/$UWW0SW9.

III
CKI

SUMMARY dF THE OFFERING

EX. 3 3 - 3<

THE EXCHANGE
OFFER
The Limited Partners may exchange their partnership interest in the Partnership in return
for common stock in Digitran Systems, Inc.
In exercising such option, the Limited Partner
will be required to pay $30,400 in cash, based
on each 1 Unit of the Partnership owned by a
Limited Partner which is being exchanged. On
the exercise of each Exchange Offer, Digitran
Systems Inc., will be released from all obligations involving that certain Guaranty and
Assumption Agreement entered by said Limited
Partners of the formation of the Partnership,
and will further receive a return of their
Promissory Note which was contributed to Partnership on its formation.
THE PARTNERSHIP

Crane Development Limited Partnership, a
Louisiana limited partnership.

THE GENERAL
PARTNER

The General Partner is Simulator Research, Inc.,
a Louisiana Corporation.
The principal office of the Partnership is 109
Michelle Circle, Lafayette, La. 70503.

STOCK

Each Limited Partner accepting the Exchange Offer
will receive 40,533 shares of common stock in
Digitran Systems, Inc. for each Unit of limited
partnership interest in the Partnership
exchanged. These shares of stock will be subject
to substantial restrictions on their transferrability. Digitran is a public corporation, with
its principal place of business in Lafayette,
Louisiana.

ROYALTY
AGREEMENTS

INVESTOR
QUALIFICATIONS

NO LIQUIDITY
OF STOCK

NO TAX RULING

Each Limited Partner who accepts the Exchange
Offer yill not be entitled to the right to future
revenues realized by the Partnership from the
sale of crane simulators.

An investor must be a Class A or Class B
Limited Partner in Crane Development Limited
Partnership.

A public market is not presently available to
trade the stock of Dig it ran acquired under the
Exchange Offer as the stock is subject to federal and state securities laws.

A ruling will not be obtained from the Internal
Revenue Service regarding the federal tax consequences associated with a limited partner accepting the Exchange Offer.

-2-

October 8,1987

Dear Mr. Gary Briggs
This letter is to confirm our conversation pertaining to
my stock of 32190 shares in certificate #2939. We are presently
in an underwriting and as soon as we are finished with this
project we will complete a Form D to issue you 40,533 shares of
restricted stock. At that time you will return my personal stock
to me.
Sincerely yours,
Loretta P. Records

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS, a/k/a
LORETTA GALLENT

*

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*

No. 920000001

Petitioner,
vs.

•

GARY M. BRIGGS

•

Respondent.

*
*

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff's action is barred
by the Statute of Limitations or alternatively by the Statute of
Frauds.

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

on the grounds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law based on undisputed facts set forth in Defendant's
deposition and Plaintiff's affidavit.

The same was argued on the

27th day of July, 199 3 and taken under advisement.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's action is barred by the
** o^Statute of Limitations.

VjcW
If

Upon reflection of those arguments made

by the parties and in review of the exhibits presented to the

\ [
li6K

Court, the Court finds that the issue is one of contract and is

* '
not barred by the Statute of Limitation.
MICRO FILMED
DATE:

f?/<*[<?3

3k&

Case Ho
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4*6

STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Defendant argues that exhibit 6, the Irrevocable Stock
Power, is the only admissible evidence of the transaction
concerning the 32,190 shares of stock.

He claims that the

exhibit is clear on its face and any other document or testimony
explaining it is barred by the parole evidence rule.

As such#

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no action against Defendant.
The Court does not agree.
Exhibit 6 is only one a series of documents in a transaction
between Plaintiff and Defendant.

There is sufficient question,

as to why these shares of stock were transferred, to support the
admission of other evidence explaining the context and
understanding of the parties at the time of transfer.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff argues that the agreement between the parties is
clear, leaving no genuine issue of material fact and entitling
Plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law.
It is undisputed that Defendant entered into an agreement to
prepay the class note to Digitran.

As a part of the agreement

Defendant elected to pay $30,400, half the value of the original
note, in cash to Crane Development Limited Partnership.

The

following was part of the consideration given to Defendant for
the prepayment:

(1) Defendant's promissory note would be

canceled and delivered to him, (2) Digicrane would execute an
amendment to the Guaranty and Assumption Agreement, (3) Defendant
2

would receive one share of Common Stock from Digitran for each
$0.75 contributed by Defendant in cash upon the execution of the
Agreement.

Defendant paid the $30,400 and was guaranteed to

receive the stock by June 1, 1986.
By October 1987, Defendant had still not received the stock
from Digitran as promised.

Defendant met with Plaintiff at this

time and received 32,190 shares of Plaintiff's personal stock.
Defendant's own testimony as to this transaction explained that
the delivery of the stock was "security for the good faith
performance . . . by Digicrane/Digitran."
A year later, November 22, 1988, Defendant received a stock
certificate from Digitran for 40,533 shares of stock, the amount
of stock owed from the prepayment agreement. An interest payment
was also paid April 1988 to Defendant in the amount of $1824 to
compensate him for the delay.
Defendant has not returned the 32,190 shares of stock given
him in 1987 by Plaintiff.

He claims they were to act as

security, not only for the 40,533 shares of stock, but to ensure
good faith efforts from the company for other difficulties
Defendant was having, particularly the payment of royalties from
Digicrane.

Plaintiff has brought this action to recover this

stock.
The 32,190 shares of stock given to Defendant by Plaintiff
were admittedly given as "security for a good faith performance."
They were delivered at a time when Digitran had still not
delivered the 4 0,53 3 shares of stock pursuant to the prepayment
3

agreement.

There was no other clear obligation at that time to

Defendant.

It is apparent Defendant feels he has a right to

receive royalty payments from Digicrane or Digitran.

Whether he

is correct in this claim is not an issue before this Court.
Defendant has received the stock promised him in the prepayment
agreement.

Defendant has failed to establish why he is entitled

to retain the other 32,190 shares.
Summary Judgment is granted.

Plaintiff's Motion for

Counsel for Plaintiff is directed

to prepare a formal order in conformance herewith.
Dated this

/

day of August, 1993.
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Case No: 920000001 CN
Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on the

5 *~ day of

(2<"Aj.^-f

j3l3—>

I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the
attached document to the following:
JOSEPH CHAMBERS
Atty for Defendant
31 FEDERAL AVENUE
LOGAN UT 84321

GARY N. ANDERSON
Atty for Plaintiff
175 EAST 100 NORTH
LOGAN UT 84321

GEORGE W. PRESTON
Atty for Defendant
31 FEDERAL AVENUE
LOGAN UT 84321
District Court Clerk
By:
Deputy Clerk

1

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS,
aka LORETTA GALLANT,
Plaintiff

*

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*

Case No. 920000001

*

VS.

GARY M. BRIGGS,
Defendant

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on an Objection to the
Proposed Findings of Fact and Order. The Objection is overruled.
This Memorandum will serve as notice that the Findings and Order,
as proposed, have been signed and entered.

Qfih
DATED this

n

day of September. 1993.
BY THE COUR

GORDON J. LOW
FIRST DISTRICT COURT

RECORDS aka GALLANT v. BRIGGS
Case No. 920000001
Page 2
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, Loretta Penfold Records aka Gallant
v. Gary M. Briggs, Case No. 920000001, postage prepaid, this

q^

day of September, 1993, to the following attorneys:
GREGORY SKABELUND
Attorney for Plaintiff
2176 North Main
North Logan, Utah 84321

GEORGE W. PRESTON
Attorney for Defendant
Preston & Chambers
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321

GARY N. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen
175 East 100 North
Logan, Utah 84321

JOSEPH M. CHAMBERS
Attorney for Defendant
Preston & Chambers
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321

*L

Court Secretary

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS,
aka LORETTA GALLANT,
Plaintiff

*
*
*
*
*
*

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 920000001

vs.
GARY M. BRIGGS,

*

Defendant
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT upon an Objection to the
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. As noted in the
Plaintiff's response9 much of the argument by the Defendant is not
to the form of the Findings but to the Memorandum Decision itself.
For those reasons and to the reasons that the Court finds the
proposed Findings and Order comport with the Memorandum Decision
and with the evidence at trial, reflected in the Memorandum
Decision or not, the Objection is overruled and this Memorandum
will serve as Notice of Entry that the proposed Findings and Order
have been adopted and docketed by the Court.
DATED this

day of September, 199>-7
BY THE

JE GORDON J. LOW
FIRST DISTRICT COURT

RECORDS aka GALLANT v. BRIGGS
Case No. 920000001
Page 2
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION. Loretta Penfold Records aka Gallant
v. Gary M. Briggs, Case No. 920000001, postage prepaid, this
day of September, 1993, to the following tattorneys:
GREGORY SKABELUND
Attorney for Plaintiff
2176 North Main
North Logan, Utah 84321

GEORGE W. PRESTON
Attorney for Defendant
Preston & Chambers
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321

GARY N. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen
175 East 100 North
Logan, Utah 84321

JOSEPH M. CHAMBERS
Attorney for Defendant
Preston & Chambers
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321

Pp. Sin.
Court Secretary

Gc
N. A n d e r s o n # 8 8 0 0
Hi—YARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
A PROFESSIONAL

CORPORATION

ATTORNEYS AT

L-AW

175 EAST FIRST NORTH
L O G A N , U T A H 84321
TELEPHONE (601) 7 5 2 - 2 6 1 0
TELEFAX (801)

753-8895

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS,
a/k/a LORETTA GALLENT,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ..

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 92-01

GARY M. BRIGGS,
Defendant.

Judge Gordon J. Low

cA

This matter came before this Court on the basis of
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
Plaintiff's action is barred by an applicable statute of
limitations or by an applicable statute of frauds.
Plaintiff also filed a motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law based on undisputed facts set forth in Defendant's
deposition and Plaintiff's affidavit.

Oral argument was had

on both motions on July 27, 1993, at which time the Court
took the matter under advisement and issued a memorandum
decision which sets forth the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
RE:
1.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

As to the statute of limitations argument, the

statutes of four states could be involved, namely
MICRO FILMED
DATE:

Risim

Louisiana, Colorado, Texas and Utah.

Defendant asserted

initially that the Utah statutes applied, but, being faced
with the statute that tolls the time in Utah as long as the
Defendant was out-of-state, he changed his position and
claimed that the Texas statute for recovery of personal
-

property was applicable.

Defendant concedes that if

o

i

Plaintiff's action is based on contract claims, none of the

<
2-

statutes in the four states would have run by the time the

<
o

3

action was filed.

The Court having examined the pleadings

i

g and exhibits finds that the issue in the case is one of
z

£ contract.
n
2
2. On the statute of frauds argument, Defendant argues
10

- that exhibit 6 to Defendant's deposition, which has been
z
u

13 filed with the Court and admitted to evidence along with the
z deposition and the remaining deposition exhibits, is the
o

g only admissible evidence of the transaction concerning the
z
<

6 32,190 shares of stock which is the subject of this action.
<
>

u.

J° Defendant
thatrule.
the exhibit
is clear
on its face
the paroleclaims
evidence
The Court
has examined
the and
X

<

transaction
betweenitthe
2 evidence
any otherrelating
documentto
orthe
testimony
explaining
is Plaintiff
barred by
and Defendant and finds that there is sufficient question as
to why these shares of stock were transferred to support the
admission of other evidence explaining the context and
understanding of the parties at the time of transfer. The
Court also finds that the complete transaction between the

•2-

parties can only be ascertained by reviewing the series of
documents in evidence relating to the transaction.
FINDINGS OF FACT
RE:
3.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff argues that the agreement between the

parties is clear, leaving no genuine issue of material fact
CD

I

<
D

z
<
o

and entitling Plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law. It
is undisputed that Defendant entered into an agreement to

3

prepay the partnership note owed to Crane Development

g

Limited Partnership, by paying the amount of $30,400, half

z
I-

{? the value of the original note. Part of the consideration
S given to Defendant for the prepayment was:

(1) Defendant's

UJ
10

- promissory note would be canceled and delivered to him;
z'
UJ

3

(2) Digicrane would execute an amendment to the Guaranty and
of Common Stock from Digitran for each $0.75 contributed by
z Assumption Agreement; (3) Defendant would receive one share
c:
g Defendant in cash upon the execution of the Agreement,.
kJ

o
<

z
>
<

d Defendant paid the $30,400 and was guaranteed to receive the
i

8 stock by June 1, 1986.
iZ

°

4.

By October 1987, Defendant had still not received

<

the stock from Digitran as promised.

Defendant met with

Plaintiff at this time and received 32,190 shares of
Plaintiff's personal stock. Defendant's own testimony as to
this transaction explained that the delivery of the stock
was "security for the good faith performance ... by
Digicrane/Digitran."

nn i

5.

A year later, November 22, 1988, Defendant received

a stock certificate from Digitran for 40,533 shares of
stock, the amount of stock owed from the prepayment
agreement.

An interest payment was also paid in April 1988

to Defendant in the amount of $1,824 to compensate him for
the delay.
CD
I

<

D

z
<
o

6.

Defendant has not returned the 32,190 shares of

stock given him in 1987 by Plaintiff.

He claims they were

3 to act as security not only for the 40,533 shares of stock,
i

o but to ensure good faith efforts from the company for other
c difficulties Defendant was having, particularly the payment
S of royalties from Digicrane.

Plaintiff brought this action

- to recover this stock.
z
ui

j

Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court sets

«

z forth the following:
to

g

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

z
<

g
<

1.

The Court having determined that Plaintiff's action

>•

IJ is based on contract, there is no applicable statute of
X

2 limitations barring Plaintiff's complaint.
U°
2. The transaction between the Plaintiff and Defendant
is reflected in a series of documents and there is
sufficient question as to why the 32,190 shares of stock
were transferred to support the admission of other evidence
explaining the context and understanding of the parties at
the time of transfer.

Consequently, the Court finds as a

matter of law that exhibit 6, the Irrevocable Stock Power,

must be construed together with other documents which are in
evidence and with Defendant's own testimony, and Defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of
frauds must be denied.
3.

The Court having determined that the 32,190 shares

- of stock given to Defendant by Plaintiff were admittedly
D

i given as "security for a good faith performance"; they were
<

*• delivered at a time when Digitran had still not delivered
o

S the 40,533 shares of stock pursuant to the prepayment
i
g agreement; and there was no other obligation at that time
Z

»-

{? owed to Defendant; Plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of
n
S law, to the return of the stock certificates, or if that is
UJ
in

- not possible, to damages equal the value of said shares,
z
3
4. The Court has examined the relevant documents and
o
z while it is apparent that Defendant feels he may have a
en

g claim for r o y a l t i e s , that claim i s not an issue before the

z
<

o Court.

Defendant received the stock promised him in the

<
>•

J prepayment agreement and has failed to establish why he is
i

1
u2 entitled to retain the other 32,190 shares. Plaintiff is
° entitled to judgment as a matter of law since there is no
<

genuine issue of material fact at issue in this case.
DATED this *?th day of Jk6guet, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was
mailed, postpaid, to the following this 16th day of August,
1993:
CM
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George W. Preston
Joseph M. Chambers
Preston & Chambers
Attorneys for Defendant
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, UT 84321
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Secretary

G; • N. Anderson #8800
Hi^YARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

ATTORNEYS AT

L-AW

175 EAST FIRST NORTH
L O G A N . U T A H 84321
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 2 - 2 6 1 0
TELEFAX ( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 3 - 8 8 9 5

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
L0RETTA PENFOLD RECORDS,
a/k/a LORETTA GALLENT,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
GARY M. BRIGGS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 92-01
Judge Gordon J. Low

This matter came before this Court on the basis of
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
Plaintiff's action is barred by an applicable statute of
limitations or by an applicable statute of frauds.
Plaintiff also filed a motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law based on undisputed facts set forth in Defendant's
deposition and Plaintiff's affidavit.

Oral argument was had

on both motions on July 27, 1993, at which time the Court
took the matter under advisement and issued a memorandum
decision.

Based upon the foregoing and good cause

appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment based on

statute of limitations be and is hereby denied.
2.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment based on

the basis of the statute of frauds be and is hereby denied, O - ^

3-

Plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to the

return of the 32,190 shares of stock given to Defendant as
security for a good faith performance, plus any benefit
received by Defendant while this stock has been in his
possession; or, if that is not possible, to damages equal to
the value of said shares, plus any benefits derived
CO
00

I

<

H
D

z
<
o

therefrom.
4.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment as a matter of law

S since there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining
x

g in this case, and Defendant is hereby ordered to return the

z
H

2 stock plus any benefits received.

If this cannot be

H

S effected, then Plaintiff shall be granted money damages in
in

- an amount to be established upon further order of this
z*

3 Court.

kJ

o
«
z
o

1

DATED this

/£

day of<3rt*§«rt, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

z
<
6
<

£Lsty:ict Co(tirt Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER was mailed, postpaid, to the following this
16th day of August, 1993:
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George W. Preston
Joseph M. Chambers
Preston & Chambers
Attorneys for Defendant
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, UT 84321
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